1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
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3	YARON UNGAR, et al C.A. NO. 00-105 L
4	Plaintiffs
5	v
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7	THE PALESTINIAN DECEMBER 3, 2010
8	AUTHORITY, et al PROVIDENCE, RI
9	Defendants
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12	BEFORE: MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID L. MARTIN
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14	APPEARANCES:
15	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: DAVID J. STRACHMAN, Esq.
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19	Providence, RI 02903 831-2700
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DECEMBER 3, 2010

THE COURT: This is the matter of the estate of Yaron Ungar, et al vs The Palestinian Authority, et al, Civil Action No. 00-105 L. There are three motions scheduled for hearing in this matter this morning.

Those three motions bear the document numbers 572, 583 and 604. The Court intends to take the motions up in the order in which I've just announced them. The attorneys will identify themselves, please.

MR. WISTOW: Max Wistow for the plaintiffs.

MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the plaintiffs.

MR. HILL: Good morning, your Honor. Brian Hill for the defendants.

MR. SHERMAN: Deming Sherman for the defendants.

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. All right, the first motion that we're going to take up is document number 572, the title of which is defendant The Palestinian Authority's motion to compel answers to defendant's interrogatories numbers 19 to 21, and responses to defendants' request for production numbers 23, 25, 26 and 29 to 35.

All right, Mr. Hill, I'll hear you, sir.

MR. HILL: Hello again, your Honor. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. HILL: Let me start by making a preparatory remark which is discovery is now closed, and so we're in the unusual posture of asking you to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents at a point in time when we're unable to do any further discovery based on any production the Court may order.

I would also note for the Court, as you may have seen in the docket, that on Monday we separately moved to exclude from evidence at the January hearing any witnesses who have not been identified before the close of discovery, any experts for whom we have not received expert disclosures, any experts for whom we have not had the opportunity to take a deposition, and any documents that have not been produced. So this motion may have been overtaken by that subsequent motion of the defendants.

THE COURT: I'm going to just interrupt,

Mr. Hill, on that point. The Court had earlier

indicated that it would hear this motion on an earlier

date. When that date came, it had to be rescheduled

because I was ill, I simply want to place that on the

record. My recollection was that we had a chambers

conference about scheduling. You indicated the

defendants were eager to have the Court address this

motion, and were asking to have the Court rule on the motion on the papers without a hearing, and that counsel for the plaintiffs, I think it was Mr. Strachman, indicated that the plaintiffs would like the opportunity to have a hearing and be heard on the motion, and in response to that request, the Court said, all right, it would place the matter down for hearing. I forget the exact date but I'm sure the record reflects it, and on that date regrettably I was ill and, therefore, the motion had to be rescheduled. I believe it was initially rescheduled, I think to Tuesday --

MR. HILL: This past Wednesday.

THE COURT: This past Wednesday.

MR. HILL: Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Sherman asking if the motion could be placed on today's calendar with the other two motions that were scheduled for hearing, and my response was that was agreeable with the Court. I had only put it down for Wednesday in response to my understanding that defendants were eager to have it heard as soon as possible. I understand that I may have concluded that two days didn't make a lot of difference and you'd like the opportunity to be here in person. In any event, I did move it from Wednesday to Friday. But I felt I

wanted to put on the record how it came to be that this motion is being heard on December 3rd and not earlier, given the fact that the Court had indicated it would hear it on an earlier date. All right, you can --

MR. HILL: Your Honor, I agree with everything you've said and, in fact, the rationale for us asking to move it from Wednesday to today is precisely as your Honor said, just to avoid a second trip up here.

So having said that as a predicate, let me make clear for the record that the relief defendants are primarily seeking is the motion to exclude which was filed on Monday, and I understand that has not been referred to your Honor, and it's not before you today. So what your Honor is left to do then is do something with this motion in light of the fact that it may be mooted if the Court subsequently grants the motion to preclude. And I'm happy to address it with that understanding and that caveat.

THE COURT: I want to be sure I understand what you're saying, Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What you're saying is if the motion to exclude is granted, it moots the motion here.

MR. HILL: It would moot it in substantial part. For example, I don't need to know any other witnesses

that are not going to be called at the hearing. I don't need any further expert disclosures on experts that are not going to testify at the hearing. I believe I was entitled to that discovery during the discovery during the discovery period and for the reasons your Honor just articulated we didn't get a ruling in time for us to do anything about it. So our principal relief would be that these people would not be allowed to testify at the hearing, and that any documents that haven't been produced to us before the close of discovery wouldn't be utilized.

THE COURT: When you say "these people", which people?

MR. HILL: The ten expert witnesses that plaintiffs have thus far disclosed and any further witnesses that they would disclose in response to an order from the Court requiring the compulsion. So here's what I would suggest. I would suggest it's proper for the motion to be granted with the understanding that I'm not waiving my argument that these people should be precluded in any event because they weren't given to us in time to do discovery.

THE COURT: Why don't you make your argument on this motion then.

MR. HILL: Thank you, your Honor. So the issue

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appears to be then what the Court intended when it entered the June 1st order allowing discovery in this case, and I think it's worth quoting the order, which is document 489 in the record. This is the Court's June 1st, 2010 order entered by Judge Lagueux, which says: "Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is ordered that all pre-hearing discovery be completed by November 19, 2010." The Court further orders that counsel present the following by December 17th, 2010, a typewritten memorandum, and then there is a description of what the memorandum will include, a list of exhibits intended to be offered, and there's some details about how those have to be disclosed, a list of all witnesses indicating those to testify as experts, probable length of evidentiary hearing, any additional matter which counsel feels will aid the Court in the disposition of the hearing of said action, and then it says an evidentiary hearing will be held on January 18th. And paragraph 9, of the order says, failure to strictly comply with this order will result in appropriate sanctions which may include dismissal or default. So there's nothing in the order which says the defendants cannot discover the identity of witnesses that the plaintiff will call at the hearing. There's nothing in the order that says the defendants cannot

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discover opinions that experts called by the plaintiffs may offer, or the bases for those opinions, and there's nothing in the order that says defendants cannot discover the identity of the exhibits the plaintiffs may offer at the hearing in January. The plaintiffs, however, have taken the position that because of the procedural posture of the case, which is, as the Court knows, on a motion to vacate an existing judgment the normal rules of civil procedure and the disclosure requirements of Rule 26, in particular, don't apply, and because the Court has required a memorandum on December 17th that requires disclosure of certain things to the Court, that therefore the defendants can't discover that material beforehand. And I would suggest two things. First of all, the argument about whether Rule 26 technically applies or doesn't is not relevant to this particular motion. It will be to one we talk about later today I suppose. But secondly, there's nothing in the Court's order that says you can't discover who your opponent is going to call at a hearing. In fact, I would suggest that that is one of the very basic things that civil discovery allows so you can find out who the witnesses are and then depose them so that when you get to a hearing you know what they're going to say and you can efficiently cross-examine them. Same thing with

experts, there's nothing in this order that says we can't find out what their expert opinions are and what the bases for them are. There's nothing in the order that says we can't discover what their exhibits are.

And so I would respectfully suggest that the motion to compel should be granted with the caveat I gave earlier that I don't mean to waive the preclusion argument, which was made in a separate pending motion.

Let me address the second part of the motion which goes to discovery related to damages. We have also propounded an interrogatory, which is interrogatory number 21, asking the plaintiffs if they contend that the amount of damages that were previously entered by the Court in the default judgment would withstand adversarial testing in this matter, and they have answered that interrogatory in part and said, yes, they believe it will. And they have provided us with some of the bases for that assertion. We would respectfully ask that the Court enter an order requiring them to give us a full and complete answer to that interrogatory that tells us the full bases for their contention that the amount of damages and the default judgment will withstand adversarial testing.

We have also asked for certain documents relevant to the amount of damages, and these documents fall into

roughly two categories. Documents related to the claim by the plaintiff that the minor plaintiffs, the children of Mr. Ungar, have suffered mental injuries as a result of their father's death, and these are categorically any mental health records, any medical records, and preschool or school records.

THE COURT: Mr. Hill, that I recall you argue in your memorandum that because the Court found that the two children would suffer mental illness in the future you're entitled to this discovery, and the Court found that the children would suffer mental anguish. Is it your contention that mental anguish is mental illness?

MR. HILL: Well, your Honor was here in 2002 at that hearing, I was not, but you did hear expert testimony from Dr. Alan Brenman who opined that the children were, among other things, more susceptible to suffer from mental illness in the future because of their father's death and so -- and I believe that your Honor specifically referenced that testimony in the Report and Recommendation that was subsequently adopted by Judge Lagueux as the basis for the damage award in this case. And so I think, therefore, whether or not these minor plaintiffs have manifested mental illness is relevant to the reliability of Dr. Brenman's testimony that they were more likely to do so. And we have, in

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fact, submitted an expert report from our own expert Dr. Eileen Ryan who has said that she does not believe that Dr. Brenman had an adequate basis, did an adequate methodological exam of the minor plaintiffs to draw the conclusions that he then offered to the Court and which I respectfully submit the Court then took and relied upon in rendering the amount of damages that were made by the plaintiffs in this case. As the Court recalls was, I believe, \$10 million per child before trebling. So it's a substantial award for people that are obviously -- I don't mean to minimize the fact that these children lost their father, but whether or not the amount of that award is able to withstand adversarial testing will involve, I think, fairly an inquiry of whether those minor plaintiffs have suffered any mental illness as a result of their father's premature death. And the admissibility of Dr. Brenman's testimony will, in part, turn on whether or not under Daubert he did an adequate examination such that he had an adequate methodology to render the opinions that he gave to the Court and how much the Court relied at the time. So I would submit that this is relevant for that purpose. And it would be relevant, incidentally,

whether or not we are talking about additional material

beyond what was given to the Court in 2002, as you may

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recall from the October argument when Mr. Rochon was talking about the need for mental examinations. position is that the \$116 million will not withstand adversarial testing, and we intend to demonstrate that through, among other things, expert testimony that shows those amounts are respectfully too much for the damages that were demonstrated to the Court in July of 2002. That will include inquiry about whether the expert testimony that the plaintiffs presented and how much the Court relied was admissible and otherwise appropriate under the Daubert standard. So these materials will inform those decisions, and will inform the argument about whether or not as a matter of fact those amounts are appropriate. So I would submit that they are relevant and we ought to get them even at this point in the case.

THE COURT: You may continue or conclude. It's your pleasure.

MR. HILL: I just wanted to make sure I wasn't interrupting a forth coming question from the Court.

The other category is related in terms of the theory of relevance, and it is materials related to the death of Mr. Ungar. So these are the autopsy materials, the police reports, photographs of the crime scene, some of which we have and some of which were in the record in

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July of 2002. We're just asking that we get all of that material so our own forensic pathologist can examine that material and have the best bases possible for opining about the reliability of the testimony the Court took from Dr. Friedman in July of 2002 who, as the Court may recall, was not a forensic pathologist. And I note in this regard that the plaintiffs themselves have, albeit late in the process, provided us with expert reports from their own psychiatrists, own psychologist, excuse me, Dr. Brenman, who apparently intends to There's a different issue about whether the Court is going to allow testimony on this, which I don't want to get into right now, prepared to testify in January, and from their own forensic pathologist, who's prepared to testify in January, and I think fairness in civil discovery requires that our experts have access to this material to the extent the plaintiffs have it, and I therefore respectfully ask that those materials be compelled as part of this motion, as well. And I think, unless the Court has questions for

And I think, unless the Court has questions for me, I will sit down then and let you hear from the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Hill.

MR. WISTOW: Your Honor, I would like to put this motion, and the other two motions that your Honor has

scheduled for hearing today, in context.

What needs to be recalled here is --

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Wistow. I just realized that you didn't state your name when you went to the podium and it will help whoever transcribes these proceedings. Mr. Wistow is recognized. You may proceed.

MR. WISTOW: Thank you. There's a terrible irony that the plaintiffs are confronted with in this case, and I hope it's going to become apparent in a few moments.

This suit was brought in March of 2000.

Discovery was resisted by the defendants and, in part, was the reason the judgment, final judgment, was entered against them in July of 2004, which was affirmed by the First Circuit. There was a creditor's bill, your Honor is familiar with that, in 2006, where the defendants were, in effect, deprived of their stock ownership in the Palestinian Investment Fund. There was a motion to vacate all of this in December of 2007, some two and a half years after the original judgment was entered.

And, of course, the First Circuit reversed Judge Lagueux because Judge Lagueux refused to vacate the judgment.

He imposed a per se rule that a willful defaulter cannot get a vacation or a vacatur of a judgment, and that he

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    needed to hear multiple issues. And, indeed, Judge
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    Lagueux scheduled discovery in this case, as my brother
    has indicated.
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           What needs to be understood, your Honor, I think
    it's very central, is the plaintiffs had achieved
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    judgment years before. On October 15th, 2010, six weeks
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    ago, they, the defendants handed to the plaintiffs their
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    expert disclosures, and I'd like to hand them up to the
    Court. I don't expect the Court to read them, I just
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    want the Court to get a sense of the heft of what was
    given to us on October 15th. This was -- these
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    documents are the principal bases for the request for
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    the vacatur. May I hand these to the Court?
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           THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Hill?
           MR. HILL: I don't object to you getting the
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    documents. I will respond to the characterization if I
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    may separately.
           THE COURT: All right. I'll give you that
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    opportunity.
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           MR. HILL: Thank you.
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           (PAUSE)
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           THE COURT: These were received by the plaintiffs
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    on October 15th, is that correct?
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           MR. WISTOW: They were sent electronically and
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    received on October 15th. They were under a cover
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letter where the defendants purported to tender them pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2), which requires disclosure of expert reports 90 days before trial. That rule, of course, allows the other side, if it's applicable, to provide any rebuttal experts within 30 days of receiving the defendants' disclosures.

By the way, before I talk about our disclosures, I would like to point out that October 15th is almost precisely 90 days before the scheduled hearing, not trial, which was down for January 18th, 2010, almost precisely that date. If your Honor wants to take the trouble, you'll see that every one, every one of defendants' expert disclosures, with one exception, is dated October 15th, the date we got them. It's clear that the defendants told their experts not to send the reports until that last day. There's one exception, and that exception, one of the several experts, his report is dated October 14th.

So, we are confronted then with a disclosure of multiple expert witnesses in areas that are extremely unusual, in some respects. For example, one of the disclosures, Glen Robinson, an expert, supposed expert on terrorism, is going to be talking about the effect on the foreign policy of the United States, is not a very typical situation. And there are other expert reports

very unusual in nature. We felt, and we still feel, that Rule 26 is only applicable to experts who are going to testify at trial, and I make a technical distinction, and I'm going to amplify that later, but in an excess of caution, in an absolute abundance of fear, we said we better get our experts in within 30 days of that disclosure to us. Even though we don't think it's required, we don't want to take the chance that somehow the Court will say this is Rule 26 and we violated that. So within 30 days on November 15th we supplied expert reports which I would like to hand up to the Court.

THE COURT: All right, you may do so.

MR. WISTOW: Again, just for the heft of what was involved here.

THE COURT: These were served or transmitted to the defendants on November 15th?

MR. WISTOW: That's right. Within the 30 days which we don't even believe was required, but in an excess of caution we did it. And believe me, I think your Honor can see there had to be a lot of scurrying because, for example, one of their experts was a forensic pathologist, a Dr. Baden, who said that he believed that the decedent husband died within approximately two seconds of the attack rather than the up to 30 seconds as your Honor had found, we had to get

somebody to rebut that, and we did that, and we supplied that to the defendants within 30 days. At the same time, we were scurrying around trying to respond to all of the other things they were talking about. There were numerous issues that have arisen here.

On top of that, your Honor, on top of that, on October 29, 2010, we received from Mr. Hill the investigation of the murders by the Palestinian Authority, I should say the investigation by the Palestinian Authority, of the murders, something that should have been supplied to us six years before, more than six years before. We got that on October 29th. And I'd like to hand that up to your Honor.

THE COURT: You may. Is there an objection, Mr. Hill?

MR. HILL: Again, I'd like to respond to the characterization, but I understand I'll get a chance to.

THE COURT: You'll get a chance to make some remarks. This was received on October 29th from the defendants?

MR. WISTOW: Yes, your Honor, and I'm enclosing the cover letter. Now, if you stop and think about what is going on here, this is a case where we have a judgment. It was by default, in part, because there was no adequate disclosure, years ago. We're now in a very

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compressed period struggling, struggling, to comply with the massive requests that have been put upon us. At the same time we're trying to get discovery out of them. Αt the same time, there was, I don't know if your Honor is aware of this, there was a motion to intervene by the Palestinian Investment Group for the administrative employees of Gaza. That was heard in front of Judge He denied that. Lagueux. That's on appeal. There's a myriad of activities that have been going on here. We're doing our very best to stay current, and we're confronted with a response by these defendants that our responses to their discovery is not as rapid as they expect.

They talked about a psychologist, Dr. Ryan, that they've hired. Dr. Ryan has put in a report that basically says that she disagrees with the methodology that was used by our expert, that it was not a sufficient forensic evaluation. We had to prepare a rebuttal for that. Bear in mind, your Honor, we only got this October 15th. We prepared a rebuttal for that. They brought in a pathologist, Dr. Baden, on October 15th. We had to get a rebuttal for that. They brought in two experts, supposedly experts, on Israeli law, a Messrs, lawyers in Palestinian Authority, Dahleh and Shehadeh. We had to get, and we did get, within 30

days, responses, expert reports, disputing what their experts said.

On November 4th, your Honor, November 4th, the defendants amended their answers to interrogatories and added four new witnesses, Mohammad Dahaln, Hiba Husseini, Rafik Husseini, Afif Safieh.

On November 11th, the defendants added three more witnesses in their amended answers to interrogatories, Yousef Qaddah, Hassan Asfour, Mazen Jadallah, and specifically said in their answers to interrogatories on November 11th when they entered this, that they reserved the right to add additional witnesses up through and including the time of the January hearing.

At the same time while all of this is going on, not only are we confronted with the appeal in the First Circuit on the motion to intervene, we're fighting about collection efforts in other ports to try to preserve the attachments and restraints we have in various other places. We've done, I believe, a yeoman's efforts.

Let me say specifically what the motion to compel is about. It's about interrogatories 19 through 21, and let me specifically address what they've asked for. They've asked for in 19 the witnesses at the hearing. We've given them our experts reports. We fully expect that everyone of those experts will be witnesses at the

hearing. We've written to them and said please consider these experts as witnesses pursuant to the answers to the interrogatories. As far as I know at the moment, at the moment I stand here, your Honor, there's one possible fact witness that we're trying to get. I can't say we're going to be able to do it, but we've disclosed what we know at this moment. There's been no requirement other than answers to interrogatories that we make these disclosures.

Number 20 is the experts. We've made a full disclosure of the experts. I don't know what else we can do.

Then they've asked us in interrogatory number 21 for the factual basis that we have if we contend that the amount of the verdict would withstand adversarial testing. Our response to that has been two-fold: One, we've said that that issue is foreclosed, whether or not it would withstand adversarial testing, and indeed, we have a motion pending, a motion in limine, to exclude any evidence attempting to challenge the amount of the award. And the reason we have that, your Honor, is after your Honor made the recommendation to Judge Lagueux for the \$116 million total, the defendants expressly specifically objected to the amount of the award to Judge Lagueux. And I'll read you from their

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objection. Defendants -- this is verbatim. "Defendants
PA and PLO object to the report's recommendation that
multi-million dollar amounts be awarded as compensation
for the death of one person in the context of an ongoing
conflict in which thousands of innocent civilians on
both sides have been killed without any hope of
compensation." And it goes on. Compensation on such an
excessive scale is inappropriate particularly in the
case of a person living permanently in Israel or
Palestine during the ongoing Israeli Palestinian
conflict, et cetera.
       THE COURT: Mr. Wistow, do you have a document
number for what you just read from?
       MR. WISTOW: Yes, I do, I do, your Honor. Bear
with me.
       THE COURT: You can provide it after the hearing.
       MR. WISTOW: Your Honor, I can give it to you
right now. It's document 271. It was sent by
Mr. Sherman on April 19, 2004.
       THE COURT: Do you have a page number, by chance?
       MR. WISTOW: Of the quote?
       THE COURT: Yes.
       MR. WISTOW: Yes, I do. It's on page 3.
       THE COURT: Thank you.
       MR. WISTOW: So, you know, I'm not going to stand
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here and tell your Honor they did a very good job challenging the amount, but they challenged the amount expressly, and Judge Lagueux denied their objection to your Honor's recommendation. And when they went up to the First Circuit, on the initial appeal, the First Circuit noted the defendants have, and I quote, 402 F3rd 282, "The defendants have not challenged either the measure of damages utilized by the lower court or the integrity of its mathematical computation." Now, it's true, it's true, that when the case was appealed the second time to the First Circuit, what I mean by that is after the motion to vacate was filed in December of 2007 and was denied by Judge Lagueux, and the case went up again to the Circuit, at oral argument, for the very first time, it was not in anybody's briefs, for the very first time there was a discussion about the amount of the judgment, and my brother, Mr. Strachman, who argued, has no more the ability of total recall than I do, and he had quite forgotten that this issue was fully addressed before, and the Court made some comments about would this withstand adversarial testing, et cetera, but it was never argued before the Court, and it is now the subject of a motion in limine before Judge Lagueux. Now it's true, the First Circuit has sent this thing back for a "holistic" approach, but there are certain things

that I submit cannot be reviewed again, should not be.

For example, the First Circuit held there was

In personam jurisdiction over the PA and PLO. Can it be because there's a resubmission of the case that we're going to relitigate whether there's personal jurisdiction? No, because the First Circuit held there was. That was litigated.

Sovereign immunity, that cannot be relitigated, in my opinion. That was adjudicated. Whether there was a political question or not cannot be adjudicated. The fact of the matter is the issue of the amount was litigated, perhaps not very well but it was litigated, and I submit that it is absolutely too late, and that what's going to happen, I hope, is when Judge Lagueux is confronted with this issue, he's going to say the Circuit has asked me to look at all these issues, this is an issue that has been adjudicated, and it's not open, and for that reason I suggest that we have a legitimate reason for not answering the questions on damages.

Now, I hope I don't overstep my time here, your Honor, but these are very important issues, obviously, and I'd ask for the Court's indulgence.

The specific -- we went on, by the way, to answer the interrogatory about damages, and we said

notwithstanding that we think it's foreclosed, we specifically said what we relied on to support the award, and we expressly stated that it was the testimony before your Honor, your Honor's decision, and that's what we rely on.

THE COURT: Well, their complaint, Mr. Wistow, as I recall, was the phrase inter alia, meaning among other things, and the suggestion that although you identified three items, or however many it was, the phrase inter alia, I guess, concerned them that you would spring something on them at the hearing. You want to address that part of their complaint?

MR. WISTOW: Well, let me say this, I can't think of what else we're going to put in at this point, and if we do come up with something, I represent to you we will instantly identify it. I don't know what else to say.

THE COURT: The other part of their complaint was that you, I believe, cited numerous decisions in terrorism cases and yet you used the phrase numerous decisions and yet you cited only one case.

MR. WISTOW: If the Court wants me to give a citation of legal cases, we can do that in a few days, I suppose. I mean --

THE COURT: I'm just observing at this point,
Mr. Wistow, what they complained about.

MR. WISTOW: I just don't see that, you know, I'm required to cite law to support it. If that's what it comes down to, and if it makes everybody more comfortable that we're trying to comply, you know, give us a reasonable time and we'll do that.

THE COURT: Your point, Mr. Wistow, is you don't feel you have to give them anything on the issue of damages because they're precluded, but notwithstanding that, you have told them the basis for your position that you believe the amount of damages will withstand adversarial testing for these reasons, that's your position.

MR. WISTOW: Absolutely. Not only in that answer, but we gave two expert reports to support what the testimony had been before and what your Honor had decided, that would be Dr. Fanning, the pathologist, and Dr. Brenman, the psychologist, so they have those reports. I really don't know what else I could do.

Now, they also -- you know, they talk about in their request for production of documents, which we haven't addressed, they want all the documents that we intend to put into evidence. At this point in time, your Honor, other than what the experts are saying, I honest to goodness, I'm not sure what we're going to put in. And my excuse for that, my reason for saying this

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at this stage is we continually are getting things -- I mean, look at this, October 15th was when we got these complex disclosures. We got disclosures as late as November 1st -- November 11th, I'm sorry. I'm mindful of our obligations under the rules to update interrogatories on a reasonable basis, and we're ready to do that instantly, we really are. And, in any event, we have to do that by December 17th which is two weeks away anyway from the Judge's -- Judge Lagueux's disclosure. They also ask us for documents that were provided by the plaintiffs or relied on by the witnesses for the July 2000 damage hearing. We've given a privilege log and indicated that the great bulk of this is correspondence between Mr. Strachman and the individual plaintiffs and we've given you a privilege log on that. THE COURT: How many documents, approximately, are at issue do you think, Mr. Wistow, there? MR. WISTOW: Under that category, I'm going to say 15 maybe something like this. Does that sound right? And we've provided a privilege log. THE COURT: The defendant cites some case law that says there's a trend or a modern view, or an emerging view that all communications between counsel

and expert witnesses should in fact be disclosed because apparently I guess the rationale would be it bears on the opinion of the expert or at least it should be material available to the other side to fairly cross-examine the expert. Do plaintiffs disagree with the case law or that it's a merging trend, or I disagree with the proposition being advanced by the defendants. Would you comment on that, Mr. Wistow.

MR. WISTOW: Yes. I think the trend is in that direction but what's significant here is the documents that we have from experts which are on the privilege log, are from two experts who are not going to testify at the hearing. Professor Friedman and Doctor Ziderman (phonetic spelling), who is the economist who gave testimony.

THE COURT: And who was Ziderman -Professor --

MR. WISTOW: He was the economist.

THE COURT: And who was the other person?

MR. WISTOW: The other one was Friedman who testified about the shooting and he was a physician who testified about the pain and suffering. Neither one is going to be testifying here. SO I mean, it's just very bizarre to ask for the expert reports. Let me suggest this, your Honor. We've given your Honor a privilege

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log, if your Honor requires us to turn those over, you know, we'll -- of course, we'll turn them over. It just seems to me totally inappropriate. You know, one of the problems we've have is trying to keep our head above water trying to get ready for this case and it was -we've been -- we don't have the resources that the Palestinian Authority has that is a, you know, a quasi government and they've pulled out all the stops and we're just trying to, as I say, keep our head above If your Honor -- what can I say? If your Honor feels that the reports of the two experts who will not be at the hearing should be disclosed we'll disclose them. I think that they shouldn't be because they're not going to be experts at this hearing. In any event, the remaining, the remaining documents they want are the psycological records of the kids, the medical records of the kids, the daycare and preschool records, the school records, all of those things. What is that going to prove? If your Honor recalls, and I know you do, the testimony of the expert, Dr. Brenman on the children was very simple. I don't want to say superficial, but it almost was. It was almost common sense. He said that an 8 month old baby and a 20 month old baby to be suddenly deprived of their father represents psychological trauma. He stands on that, he'll be back

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to testify to that, he's not saying he did some extensive research with these kids. He stands on that, that's what he's going to say. He went on to say that children who lose their parents under certain -- at an early age are at greater risks for psychological problems in the future which he said was hard to quantify and didn't attempt to quantify. It's almost like common sense but he's prepared to come in and substantiate that and he will. What are we going to do? Are we going to get into a situation where we evaluate, well, did the risk come into being? Didn't it? other words, are these kids doing well today, are they doing badly? Are we going to open this whole thing up? What if it turns out they're doing badly today, can we increase the award? I suggest not because what happened is you put in a case based on what the situation is at the time. Now your Honor was fully aware of the relative limitations of the testimony. He was not saying that these kids will have psychological problems. And if your Honor rereads your opinion you'll see that you were aware that he did not -- you said there was an increased risk. What shouldn't be forgotten here is a great deal and I don't know how much of the award was the loss of society and companionship. They want to make a big deal out of the psychological injury which

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the plaintiffs never even made a big deal out of. never said anything but that there were increased risks which we'll prepared to prove at the trial if it becomes necessary if we have to get into that. Besides all of that the defendants themselves have said in their papers that they've agreed to freeze the issue of the damages as of the 2002 hearing. So, I can't imagine, what in the world are we doing with the school records if the damages are to be frozen as of 2002? You know, Judge, the psychiatrist they've brought in, and I've read the report very carefully, doesn't say these kids are at that increased risk, doesn't say that they didn't have trauma. What it says is Brenman did not do a forensic examination, a true forensic examination, and by the way, he agrees with that that's in the report we've submitted to them he did not do a forensic examination. He gave limited testimony to the Court which was solid, which was correct, and which was adopted by the Court. The defendants also insist that we produce the crime lab material that we have. All I know, Judge, is we've given them everything we had. They want forensics, we've given them everything that we have, they want some color photos, that's -- we've given them everything we have. They themselves admit, your Honor, on Page 5 of their reply to our objection to the motion to compel.

They admit their Rule 26(a)(2) does not apply in this

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situation. All we have is, have we complied with answers to interrogatories and the like. All I can tell your Honor is we've, we have done everything we possibly If your Honor feels that there's more that we must do, yup we will move heaven and earth to do it. I don't know what else to say. I hope, for example, we're not ordered to get school records in five days or something like that in Israel for the various reasons I've stated and also the time constraints. But, you know we've put in timely objections, we've put in objections in good faith. And for all these reasons, your Honor, in considering the context that we're in we were trying to get discovery to these people for years and we couldn't do anything and now we're approached. I respectfully ask that your Honor understand the difficulties that we've had in this case. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wistow. Mr. Hill I don't want to derail your thoughts but I can tell you I am interested in hearing your response to the argument

that you really are precluded from relitigating the issue of damages having previously challenged unsuccessfully the amount of the damages so I'd like to have you address that.

MR. HILL: Your Honor would like me to start

with that issue? THE COURT: Yes. MR. HILL: I'd be glad to. This precise issue is the subject of the plaintiffs', I believe it's called second motion in limine which is not before your Honor today. And let me make a conceptual point and then I'm happy to address the merits if the Court wants me to. So your Honor is being asked to rule on a

the hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think so.

discovery motion that material will not be admissible at

MR. HILL: Okay.

There is a --

THE COURT: I think that's an overstatement, Mr. Hill. I understand you're saying that if I deny that portion of your motion to compel on accepting the plaintiffs' arguments if Judge Lagueux agrees with that that rationale, then one could trace how that result came about. But what the plaintiffs are saying as I understand it, that as to those requests that go to the amount of damages it should be denied because you really cannot relitigate in the context of a motion to vacate an issue that you've already litigated.

MR. HILL: Yes.

THE COURT: So I didn't mean to cut you off but I, it sounded as if to me you were saying or

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suggesting that I not reach this issue in the context of this motion and that I allow, if Judge Lagueux doesn't refer that motion in limine to me allow Judge Lagueux to make that decision. And you're nodding your head as if

MR HILL: I'm nodding, yes. Your Honor, is still speaking I don't want to interrupt.

THE COURT: Well, then tell me about that

I'm always interested if I should defer --

MR. HILL: Here's the issue. This could play out in one or two ways. Your Honor could deny our motion to compel and not give us this material. Judge Lagueux grants the motion in limine then we'll be arguing on appeal, I suppose, that Judge Lagueux erred in granting the motion in limine, and we won't get to put that evidence on at the hearing, and I suppose the motion, however the motion goes, and somebody appeals, that will be an issue for the First Circuit to resolve. If, however, you deny our motion to compel, and Judge Lagueux denies the motion in limine, then we're in a posture where we're having a hearing in January on an issue that the district court has ruled is admissible but we don't have the discovery, and that's going to affect the ability to do the hearing in January. So this is a little bit like Pascal's wager, to a certain

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extent, right? If your Honor orders this discovery, and this was the first time I heard anything about a burden associated with it, I'm not even sure there's an objection about burdensomeness, but presumably the plaintiffs can produce it, or can produce a reasonable amount of it, and will have it. If Judge Lagueux grants the motion in limine, there's no harm done. It's not coming into the hearing. The problem is the other side of the coin. If your Honor denies our motion to compel, and we don't have the evidence, then Judge Lagueux is going to have to make findings based on the hearing in January when everybody seems to agree this would be relevant to the issue of whether the damages would sustain adversarial testing, and that evidence won't be before him. And so that's the problem with denying it on the basis that it's unlikely to be admissible at the hearing, and that's why I would suggest, as your Honor suggested I was suggesting, that you not reach that issue, but you instead just rule in accordance with, by the way, if there's repeating, the order that your Honor entered in July, which was not appealed to Judge Lagueux, that it is permissible to have discovery on this issue, and I can just remind the Court of that history, and I'm sure you're aware of it, but early on in the discovery period there was a suggestion at a

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hearing both off the record and on the record, I believe, by Judge Lagueux, that he had a concern about whether this was a legitimate area of discovery, and we filed a motion seeking leave of court to take discovery on this very issue, and the plaintiffs' filed an opposition where they said, you know, we don't agree it's relevant but we don't want to hand the defendants an issue on appeal so we don't oppose the motion, and your Honor ruled that the motion was unopposed and granted it. So if the subject matter that your Honor is being asked to rule on now is whether there should be discovery on whether damages will withstand adversarial testing, you decided that in July. You decided the answer was yes, and so I respectfully suggest that the only issue your Honor ought to be addressing with respect to damages discovery now is whether the particular discovery that is before you is appropriate. And we litigated this on the issue of mental examinations in October. Your Honor concluded that they would be too burdensome on the plaintiffs and didn't allow them, and that was consistent with your Honor's ruling that, you know, the general subject matter may be relevant but this particular discovery is not. So the particular discovery before you, I would suggest, is not unduly burdensome. In fact, Mr. Wistow has said he was

prepared to answer the interrogatory. He said he's prepared to produce the communications with the experts who testified at the prior hearing. He's told me for the first time today that he's given me all the information on the pathology and on the crime scene, anyway. So really the only issue is how much of the children's material is it reasonable for them to produce to us in the admittedly short amount of time that we have left, and I would suggest that the Court can order that they can give us what's reasonably available. Presumably the custodians of the children have this material, and it's not hard to get, or they can get it from the children's school. So that's how I would suggest your Honor deal with this.

Now, if your Honor wants me to address the merits of the motion in limine, I admittedly wasn't prepared to do that. I can do it as best I can, and I'd refer your Honor to our opposition brief and ask your Honor to read that before you rule on the issue, but I really would suggest to the Court that sitting in the context of the discovery motion the better practice would be to rule on the merits of the discovery motion without attempting to essentially prejudge what the district court may do on the motion in limine. Have I adequately addressed the Court's concern?

THE COURT: You have, Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: Thank you, your Honor. Let me return to the batting order in which things came up. I just want to address some things in the order that Mr. Wistow addressed them.

Mr. Wistow suggested that the material we served in the form of our expert reports was, I don't think he said it, but there was a notion that maybe we had done something improper and I wanted to just be clear that I don't believe we have. We provided those materials at the date they were due under Rule 26(a)(2), approximately 90 days, a little more, technically, than before the hearing on January 18th, so those were timely disclosures. We believe we were required by the rules of discovery to produce them, so I'm not sure what the basis would be to complain about them.

He also suggested, and this is why I wanted to clarify that these were the principal bases for a vacatur, I would suggest that's an over-characterization. We have, I believe, six expert witnesses. We disclosed a number of fact witnesses. We produced a number of documents, including as Mr. Wistow alluded to, the Palestinian Security Services own investigative file of the people who killed the Ungars, so there's a substantial amount of evidence that we've

produced and will be relying on that at the hearing in January.

He also suggested that we first produce the investigative file on October 29th. He did not give me a copy of what he handed your Honor, but if your Honor could look at that, or if I could see it, I believe that bates range was produced --

THE COURT: Miss Saucier, this is the third document, I believe. Show that to Mr. Wistow to make sure that that's the document that he handed up third.

MR. WISTOW: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HILL: Okay. Your Honor, what this says then is it's material that is in both Arabic and certified translation in English. The Arabic materials were produced on September 27th which was the response date for the third request for production of documents. We produced the original materials on the day in response to the third request which we'll be arguing about later today, on the day they were due. It did take us some time to get the certified translation, and we provided that on October 29th. So the plaintiffs have had this material since September 27th, albeit it in a foreign language, which was one of the issues in the case. I'm happy to tender this back to the Court.

THE COURT: Please do so.

MR. WISTOW: I'd like the Court to take judicial notice I don't speak or read Arabic, either.

MR. HILL: Neither do I, and I also don't speak or read Hebrew, but that's an issue in the cases, unfortunately.

So, you know, I'm not sure that there -- I mean, if delays and translations it's the nature of the case, there's nothing improper with us producing the certified translations in October, having given them the original Arabic on the date the response was required. And, of course, we are I note, of course as everybody agrees, required to supplement by rule, and so the fact that we've supplemented our interrogatory responses with additional witnesses as we've identified them is what we're supposed to do. So there's nothing wrong there.

With respect to the plaintiffs' experts,

Mr. Wistow said they've now given you the reports and
given us the reports for the witnesses they're going to

call. Again, if I may look at what was given to the

Court, I just have a question about it because there was

a late report. I'm not sure if it's part of that

package.

THE COURT: Miss Saucier, give it to Mr. Hill.
Mr. Hill, show that to Mr. Wistow to make sure that's

1 what was handed up second. 2 MR. WISTOW: It is, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. HILL: Your Honor, there was -- I believe I 4 5 received one report on November 12th, one on the 13th, four on the 15th, and then I received a report, which is 6 7 the last one in this package, on November 24th, which is 8 after the close of discovery. So just so the record is clear, one of these was not even given to us until after 9 10 discovery had closed, and that's the report of Dr. Boaz, B-O-A-Z Shnor, S-H-N-O-R. 11 12 THE COURT: Miss Saucier, give the sticky to 13 Mr. Hill and ask him to just attach that sticky to the 14 document that he says he got on November 29th. MR. HILL: I believe the Court said the 29th. 15 Ιt 16 was the 24th. It was the day before Thanksgiving. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. HILL: So if, in fact, and let me make this 18 19 point, the plaintiffs have also identified three other, 20 I guess, potential expert witnesses for whom we have not 21 got reports or interrogatory responses. I wasn't 22 entirely clear from what Mr. Wistow said whether those 23 three people are going to be called at the hearing or 24 not. If they're not, obviously I need their

interrogatory responses and their reports against the

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eventuality that they're allowed to testify so I can properly examine them otherwise I don't have any idea what they would say, and for that reason, unless Mr. Wistow has taken those folks off the table, we're going to need an answer to the pending interrogatory. So all this points up the fact that the plaintiffs ought to give us a clear final answer to the interrogatory, and we ought to get it respectively before the 17th of December because on December 17th, two weeks from today, we have to file our pre-hearing memoranda, and in order for us to effectively inform Judge Lagueux of who we're going to call, what exhibits we're going to use, it would obviously be helpful to know who they're going to call and what exhibits they're going to use. And Mr. Wistow talked with respect to exhibits that he wasn't quite sure yet what they were going to use. Well, if he files a brief on the 17th of December that says here are my exhibits, and I have to file a brief on that same day saying here are my exhibits, obviously it's going to be very difficult for us to ensure that we've got the right exhibits that respond to theirs. So I would respectfully request that the Court enter the -grant the motion to compel, order them to provide us with all the documents they're going to use, sometime reasonably before December 17th, identify any other

witnesses. He mentioned there was a fact witness who may be out there. I obviously don't have a chance to depose that person. I'm maintaining my right to preclude them, but I ought to know who they are so that I can, you know, if there's a document I need to put on my exhibit list, or a witness I need to put on my witness list. If I don't know who they are, there's no way for me to do that. And again, this all goes to efficiently helping Judge Lagueux know what's going to happen in January. I think those are reasonable requests and they ought to be ordered.

Let me make a couple other points about damages. With respect to the communications with the experts. Those documents are on a privilege log the plaintiffs provided to us, and your Honor mentioned -- I don't think there's a serious legal dispute about the discoverability of that material, at least prior to the amendment to the rule, and so we'd like to get those materials.

THE COURT: Mr. Hill, when you say prior to the amendment to the rule, which amendment --

MR. HILL: Nobody's mentioned it yet. Rule 26 was amended effective yesterday, and so under the implementation provisions of that, it applies to cases filed after yesterday, and whatever the standard

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you?

language is, you know, to the extent consistent with equity to pending cases. Now, nobody has argued that you ought to apply the new rule to this, particularly where these communications took place in 2002, we asked for them long before December 1st, the motion was ripe long before December 1st. You know, we're only here because of the accidents of people's timing and so forth, so unless there's some request, I don't think the Court ought to consider the current rule. But there are -- these are documents 18 to 25 on their list. obviously wouldn't be very difficult for them to produce them, and they're listed on page 13 of our brief which is document 572. So I would request that the Court order those. Now, Mr. Wistow made the point --THE COURT: Which requests are you referring to, Mr. Hill? MR. HILL: Well, I'm talking about the plaintiffs' privilege log regarding defendants' request number 25 and 26. The pertinent portion is reprinted on page 13 of our motion to compel, which is document 572. THE COURT: So you're asking the Court order that the documents listed in the privilege log be produced to

25 MR. HILL: Yes, your Honor. And now Mr. Wistow

makes a point that the two experts that these pertain to will not be testifying in January. That doesn't mean they're not relevant because, again, assuming your Honor is not going to rule that there won't be any evidence on damages, and whether they would withstand adversarial testing at the hearing in January. These experts presented testimony to your Honor on which you relied in fashioning the damages amounts, and the admissibility of that testimony, the reliability of that expert testimony, will be one of the issues that is confronted in January, assuming we get to litigate the issue of whether the damages will withstand adversarial testing. So they would be relevant even though those people won't be appearing.

On the documents related to the children, when you're talking about whether the damages are likely to withstand adversarial testing, the issue is, is the amount of money awarded appropriate for the amount of damages the children sustained, and I respectfully submit that there's a real question here that wasn't adequately developed in the prior record and we ought to have an opportunity to develop it at the hearing in January. These children were quite young at the time their parents were killed, and as Dr. Ryan points out in her report, the fact that someone is an orphan doesn't

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automatically translate into them having a mental illness, and your Honor had expert testimony at the time about the likelihood of that, and I submit relied on that in fashioning a damages amount, and what actually happened to the children as they have grown will obviously inform the reliability of a prediction that they would have mental illness, and Mr. Wistow suggested that perhaps -- and again, we don't have any of this information so I don't know whether it's true or not, what if one of these children has developed a mental illness, well, that would obviously be pertinent. the point I would make is this, your Honor made identical awards for both children. If one has developed mental illness, and another has not, that might be an argument about why the award shouldn't be identical. And so I submit that this is clearly relevant and would a Judge Lagueux in making determinations about whether these amounts are likely to withstand adversarial testing and I therefore ask that -- I'm not asking for something unreasonable but to the extent that these documents are reasonably available to the plaintiffs that they be produced to us before December 17th so we can utilize them at the hearing to the extent the Court allows argument on that issue. And on the last point about the pathology reports

and crime scene reports. Mr. Wistow has said we have everything they have. There's one issue about whether we have color copies of all the photos, but we can work those out amongst ourselves. So based on counsel's representation that they've produced everything they have, I don't see a reason for the Court to compel material that they've on the record said they don't have anymore.

Unless the Court has questions for me, I think
I'm ready to conclude on this motion.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WISTOW: May I respond very briefly, your Honor?

THE COURT: Very briefly.

MR. WISTOW: The motion that my brother referred to, to conduct discovery regarding damages, we expressly preserved, expressly preserved, all objections of any nature whatsoever regarding any questions put that's in the Court's documents. We simply said there was no reason that we wanted to fight about this at that time but preserved every single objection which we are now making on a timely basis. To require us to turn over the experts reports that are on the privilege list, experts who are not going to testify, almost certainly

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invites us to now bring those experts in because who knows what ambiguities are going to arise out of looking at say raw data or materials that are used without the person there. What is suppose to happen with those documents? It just intrudes in this case another unnecessary complication.

Finally, and I can't emphasize this too strongly, your Honor, nobody ever said, neither our expert Dr. Brenman nor your Honor, ever said that these children would have mental illness. No one ever came close to that. All it said was the loss of a parent increases the risk. That's in the record, and your Honor adopted that, and that's true and it's uncontrovertible, and to start now getting into this issue about what really happened to these kids flies in the face of every case that's ever happened. You can't get into this. People after their awards, some of them go to Lourdes and they make a fantastic recovery, and what happens then? The defendant comes in and asks for a new trial? The thing is frozen at the time. To ask now what happened to these kids since then introduces into this already amalgam of confusion, another web, and one that's absolutely prohibited. So I ask your Honor, however convenient or inconvenient it is to get these things, and I don't know, I don't know what the

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situation is in Israel in getting these records, however
convenient or inconvenient, I ask your Honor not to
order production of records which are not relevant to
what we're talking about.
       THE COURT: Mr. Wistow, is it your position that
it's frozen in time --
       MR. WISTOW: Yes.
       THE COURT: -- does that depend on whether or not
there has been litigation or with the amount of damages?
       MR. WISTOW: I don't understand your Honor's
question. I apologize.
       THE COURT: Let's say Hamas, who never did
anything in this case --
       MR. WISTOW: Right.
       THE COURT: -- in 2010 files a motion to vacate
the judgment and argues that the amount of the judgment
will not withstand adversarial testing, and they're
making the same argument these defendants are making --
       MR. WISTOW: Yes.
       THE COURT: -- they want to get the school
records of the children, the mental health records of
the children to show that --
       MR. WISTOW: I understand.
       THE COURT: -- the children have not suffered so
much --
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MR. WISTOW: Now I understand your Honor's question.

THE COURT: -- does it make a difference?

MR. WISTOW: No, it doesn't make a difference for this reason, for this reason, if the expert testified these children are having tremendous problems today, he said that to your Honor, and your Honor adopted that, and the fact of the matter is that was a bunch of baloney, unless it's relevant, I think what needs to be done is would the award withstand adversarial testing is based on what is the testimony and what did your Honor rely on and what did you conclude. So if he had said, yes, these children are having terrible psychological -they can't sleep at night, they're doing terribly at school, and they will never get out of second grade, if that's what he said and your Honor adopted that, then I could see where this would potentially become very relevant, but we need to focus on what is it that happened. What was the testimony and what did your Honor decide. I implore your Honor, and I'm sure you've done it, to reread your Honor's recommendation and you'll that it's exactly what I said, that the testimony was these kids are at an increased risk, period. didn't say 40 percent, 90 percent. You said that, too. And it's true, and we're prepared to prove that.

1 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Wistow. 2 MR. WISTOW: Thank you. THE COURT: We're going to take a ten minute 3 4 recess and then we'll take up the remaining two motions. 5 (RECESS) THE COURT: Before we proceed to the second 6 7 motion, I just want to ask plaintiffs' counsel about the 8 first motion. The defendants in their memorandum say basically this is what they're seeking in this motion, 9 the first motion, the identity of plaintiffs' hearing 10 11 witnesses, expert reports or any expert witnesses 12 plaintiffs may call for hearing, documents plaintiffs 13 may offer in evidence at hearing, and evidence regarding 14 plaintiffs' contention that the amount of damages would withstand adversarial testing. So, four things. 15 16 first thing, identity of plaintiffs' hearing witnesses. 17 Mr. Wistow, do I understand correctly, plaintiffs say they have disclosed all witnesses with the possible 18 19 exception of one? 20 MR. WISTOW: Yes, your Honor. As matters now 21 stand, the only witness other than an expert is a fact 22 witness that we don't know whether or not he's going to 23 be available we can use him. That's all we know at the

THE COURT: And as to expert reports, or any

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expert witnesses that plaintiffs may call at the hearing, you say you provided that already? MR. WISTOW: Yes, we have. THE COURT: And any documents plaintiffs may offer in evidence at the hearing, you have provided that. MR. WISTOW: No, I'm not saying that. THE COURT: You're not saying that. MR. WISTOW: I'm not saying that. We really don't know. I can say we will use all of the documents that have been exhibits in the various motions to date. If we have to go through the formality of filing an interrogatory that says that, we'll do that. But we really -- I don't know how else to say this, we have been so deluged with activity in this case that we're not a hundred percent sure of what the exhibits are going to be at this point. I don't know what else to say. May I just add one point on that? I just want to hand up to your Honor a copy of the docket from June 1st, 2010 to November 30th, I've never seen anything like it, and, you know, and it gives you an idea of what's been going on. THE COURT: Mr. Wistow, on the third category, documents plaintiffs may offer in evidence, your

response is, no, you're not representing that you have provided all the documents but you are representing that documents that you might offer in evidence at the hearing have previously been introduced as an exhibit in some proceeding.

MR. WISTOW: Yes.

THE COURT: So we're not going to have a situation where the defendants are going to say we've never seen this document before, because any documents the plaintiffs intend to utilize at the hearing in January will have been previously provided to the defendants somewhere along the line?

MR. WISTOW: By December 17th, certainly. I'm not -- I'm embarrassed to be in this situation, your Honor, but we've done everything humanly possible to try to -- to comply.

THE COURT: Going back to the first --

MR. WISTOW: Excuse me. I think there's one other, one other issue. Mr. Strachman reminds me that there are some reports -- I believe we have supplied the reports of the experts on Israeli law. I believe we have. To the best of my knowledge, your Honor, we have supplied the reports of every expert that we intend to use.

THE COURT: Mr. Wistow, just going back to the

1 first two categories. 2 MR. WISTOW: Yes. THE COURT: The identity of your witnesses and 3 4 the expert reports for those witnesses. 5 MR. WISTOW: Yes. The January hearing, you say you've 6 THE COURT: 7 given this to defendants already. MR. WISTOW: To the best -- I believe we have. 8 Is there any doubt about that, Mr. Strachman? To the 9 best of my knowledge, that's right, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: In terms of the Court granting the 11 12 motion as to those two categories, is there any 13 objection from the -- at this point, if I say that as to those two categories of documents, identity of witnesses 14 and expert witness reports, plaintiffs represent they 15 16 have provided all such names and reports to the defendants? 17 18 MR. WISTOW: Expert witnesses. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. WISTOW: That's -- what I don't, what I don't 21 want to get mixed up on here is we don't believe that 22 Rule 26(a) applies. We're complying pursuant to answers 23 to interrogatories. So what we're saying is we've 24 answered the interrogatories with reference to the 25 experts. That's what we're saying. We don't want to be

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    conceding that Rule 26(a) applies to the expert
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    disclosure.
           THE COURT: But you've also identified all your
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    witnesses, expert and nonexpert, for the January 17th
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    hearing?
           MR. WISTOW: With the -- as I said, your Honor,
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    there's a possibility of at least one fact witness, at
    least one --
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           THE COURT: But previously, Mr. Wistow, you said
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    one witness, now you're saying at least one witness --
           MR. WISTOW: Well --
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           THE COURT: How --
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           MR. WISTOW: There's only one that I'm cognizant
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    of now. There's been such activity in this case, I
    don't want to stand here and say that if we have some
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    kind of lightning bolt that hits us going over all of
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    this before December 17th that we can't supply it. I'm
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    not trying to be elusive.
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           THE COURT: Is there any reason why you could not
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    definitively identify this possible additional witness
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    in five days from today's date?
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           MR. WISTOW: I don't know. He's in Israel, and I
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    don't know. I, I --
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           THE COURT: All right.
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           MR. WISTOW: I don't know.
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THE COURT: All right, fine. I just wanted to ask those questions. MR. WISTOW: I'm trying to be as candid with the Court as possible. THE COURT: Thank you. Now with regard to the documents pertaining to damages that you claimed a privilege on. Today is Friday. I want to decide these motions as quickly as possible. I'm not sure I'm going to look at them but I think I'd like you to submit them to chambers for a possible in camera examination, so if I decide I need to do an in camera examination of them, I'll have them. I can do it this weekend, and then I can just rule as opposed to waiting until Monday and then deciding I need to see them. Could you see that copies of those documents that you claim are privileged as to your -- I'm referring to the damages experts. MR. WISTOW: Just the experts, not the communication with the clients. MR. HILL: Your Honor, if it will aid the Court, I haven't moved on the communications with the clients. I've only moved on the ones with the experts, which I believe are 18 to 25 on the --THE COURT: Number 18 to 25? MR. HILL: 18 to 25.

THE COURT: 18 to 25. Would you submit those

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    documents, 18 to 25, to my chambers today?
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           MR. WISTOW: May we do that --
           THE COURT: Mr. Strachman?
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           MR. STRACHMAN: I'm pretty sure I can, Judge.
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           THE COURT: All right. I'll be here until 6.
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           MR. STRACHMAN: Judge, I have a situation, Jewish
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    Sabbath, at 3:30.
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           THE COURT: Okay. I understand.
           MR. STRACHMAN: I'm going to do my best when we
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    get out of here.
           THE COURT: If you're not able to, I understand,
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    Mr. Strachman.
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           MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you.
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           THE COURT: If it has to wait until Monday, it
    has to wait until Monday, fine.
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           MR. STRACHMAN: Okay, thank you.
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           THE COURT: Okay, fine. That takes care of my
    questions on that first motion. We're now going to go
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    to the second motion.
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           The second motion is document 583. This is
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    plaintiffs' judgment creditors motion to strike
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    defendants' objection to and compel compliance with
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    certain requests contained in plaintiffs' judgment
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    creditors third request for production. Mr. Wistow.
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           MR. WISTOW: Thank you, your Honor. If your
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Honor has looked at the request for production, you'll notice that it's virtually identical in terms of topics to the request for 30(b)(6) depositions where your Honor made a ruling, and that's in docket number 578. You'll recall there were very extensive request for produc -- excuse me, request for depositions under 30(b)(6), and your Honor whittled them down very significantly in an order which is number 578.

We filed the request for production which mirrored the 30(b)(6) request for depositions long before your Honor had ruled, as you did, in number 578. Once -- and by the way, you ruled on that on October 28th, the 30(b)(6), and what you indicated was that you would allow discovery in certain areas, and just to sum them up, willfulness of the default that was objected to, and as a matter of fact the subject of appeal to Judge Lagueux now that the defendants contend that their willfulness and the degree of willfulness is not open to review at this time. The second was the timeliness of the motion to vacate, which they also contended was not open to review. Your Honor disagreed. That's also on appeal. But in any event, the existing order is for willfulness, timeliness. Your Honor indicated that it was appropriate to ask about the relationship between the Palestinian Investment Fund and the defendants,

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their knowledge about the collection efforts that the plaintiffs were making to recover under the judgment of 2004, the Palestinian Investment Fund actions in connection with those attempts to collect. Your Honor ruled that it was appropriate to ask questions about meritorious defenses, and also whether or not there was prejudice to the plaintiffs because of the delay in discovery, and the delay in the motion to vacate, and the basis for the defendants' affirmative contention that there was no prejudice. Your Honor under that heading also said we would be entitled to ask questions about the roles of certain leadership individuals who were noticed to deposition in the original case and whose failure to be produced was part of the reason for the default judgment. Your Honor indicated we could ask about political ramifications of the judgment, the effect on international relationship, and finally how the defendants' ability and willingness to participate in discovery differed today from where it had been on January 27, '03, and your Honor expressly referred to this when a Mr. Al- Kidwas wrote a letter to your Honor. First I want to say, I don't, for the life of me,

understand how my brother can say that we did not meet
and confer on these requests for productions. His own
attachments to his objection shows the enormous amount

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of time, not very productive time, that was spent trying to work something out, but there was an enormous effort to try to resolve this. I don't know where in the world he can come up and say that there's been no meeting to confer.

After your Honor ruled in docket number 578 limiting the issues, we've, in turn, attempted to confine our motion to those matters that fall within what your Honor said are legitimate areas. Specifically, and I'm going to do this in chronological order of the numbers of the request for production, the first is number 4.0 to 4.Z. Every one of these interrogatories relates to willfulness and timeliness. I said interrogatories, I misspoke. Request for production. They ask for any kind of records from the Palestinian cabinet, or the Palestinian Liberation Organization's executive committee, dealing with the judgment of 2004, the default judgment, and the 2006 creditors bill judgment. That's the judgment where Judge Lagueux assigned all of the PA's ownership interest in the PIF over to the plaintiffs. The motion contains an error in it. It refers to any documents relating to the action. That's not what the request for production -- the request for production, and all we're pressing, is documents that relate to the 2004 default

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judgment and the 2006 judgment on the creditors' right.

The defendants have stated after very lengthy objections, most of which are boilerplate, that they claim that neither the PA cabinet nor the PLO executive committee has any such documents. And I'll just read you what their response is to several of these. defendants hereby incorporate by reference as is fully set forth herein the foregoing general and specific objections. Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing general and specific objections, and without prejudice to defendants' right to modify, amend or supplement their responses as appropriate, defendants state that there are no documents responsive to this request. Now all I would ask there, your Honor, to those responses, is that to avoid any ambiguity later, that the objections be stricken, and if they want to stand and say there are no such documents, well, of course, we have to accept that, and so I would ask that for items 4.0 through 4.R.

Now, items 4.S through V are a little bit different. They're related but different. 4.S through 4.V specifically asks for such records of any ministry, agencies, department or bureau rather than the Palestinian Authority's cabinet or executive committee of the PLO. And interestingly enough, when it comes to

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responding to those requests -- and again, your Honor, these are the documents relating to the judgment, the default judgment. This is related to the default judgment, and which your Honor has already ruled, and I believe consistent with what Judge Lagueux has ordered, that the willfulness is an open issue, and their response -- I'm not even going to bother reading the general and specific objections because they're boilerplate, the same throughout everything here, but their response is as follows, and it's very telling: Defendants hereby incorporate by reference as is fully set forth herein the foregoing general and specific objections. This is 4.S, your Honor. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing general and specific objections, and without prejudice to defendants' right to modify, amend or supplement the responses as appropriate, defendants state they will produce documents containing nonappropriate and nonprotected information within their possession, custody or control, that are responsive to a reasonable and proper scope and interpretation of this request, and that can be found through reasonable search efforts by defendants. Now, your Honor, if that passes muster as a satisfactory answer to a request for production, I'm

going to use it myself from now on in every case that I

have because it says nothing. It says we're going to produ -- first of all, we have objections, then, but notwithstanding those objections, we'll give you the stuff that's nonprivileged and nonprotected so long as it's subject to a reasonable and proper scope of interpretation. It's absolute smoke, that answer. Now if they want to say there are no such documents, there's nothing I can do about that. But it's a world of difference between the answers saying they have none and this really elusive answer. And so I would ask your Honor that you order production of those documents. They're absolutely central to the hearing on willfulness and timeliness.

By the way, I might point out to your Honor, I don't know if your Honor is aware of this, that within the last, and I've lost track of time, I'm going to say the last couple of weeks, anyway, no more than that, the defendants have now filed a motion to vacate the 2006 creditors' bill judgment. So we're not talking just about the original 2004 judgment, they're trying to vacate the second creditors' bill judgment. And one of the things we're saying here is that they sat on their rights, let years go by, let us litigate in all kinds of other courts trying to collect on this thing, and just on that timely and -- I just go on. I should go on to

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the next subject. We're asking that they be compelled to produce the items referred to in 6.J.L, and basically those go, I don't know how anything could go more directly to meritorious defense than these items, and what they are, your Honor, is -- and recall, by the way, that the murder in question was in June of 1996. What these are asking for is, are the records of any communications, written agreements, between Hamas and on the one hand the PA, on the other hand the PLO, and finally Fatah, which is the largest political component of the --THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Wistow, you're talking about 6.J through 6.L? MR. WISTOW: That's right. THE COURT: I have your memorandum in front of me. MR. WISTOW: Yes. THE COURT: And you just concluded speaking about requests 4.0 through 4.V.

MR. WISTOW: Yes.

THE COURT: And the next group that's addressed in this request 9.A to B, 9.U to V, 13.H, S, I'm sort of flipping through your memo trying to find 6.J.

MR. WISTOW: It's there. What I've done, your Honor, is I've put them in a slightly different order

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than they are in the memo. I put them in the order, the absolute chronological order, the correct order. through L is -- if your Honor wishes, I can try to find that. I represent it's in the memo. THE COURT: Well, I see on page 15 there are three lines. It says request 6.J to L seeks documents directly related to defendants' claimed meritorious defenses. MR. WISTOW: Yes, exactly. THE COURT: So that's it? MR. WISTOW: Yes. THE COURT: Okay, continue. MR. WISTOW: What I wanted -- I thought it was better. I apologize for the way they -- I think it would have been clearer if we did the memo in the

correct order, the chronological order of the requests rather than -- that's what I'm trying to do now.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WISTOW: Because what's happened, your Honor, is you can see that the documents are so lengthy that we thought it better to just attach them as an exhibit, so I thought when your Honor's looking at these things it would be easier to look in correct -- I keep saying chronological order, I guess the correct sequential order is what I really mean.

THE COURT: All right.

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In any event, 6.J to L relates to MR. WISTOW: communications between Hamas and the PA, PLO and Fatah, in the period September 1st '93 to June 9th '96, and what that relates to, your Honor, is the early date, really the creation of the PA under the Oslo Accords and the last date relates to when the murder took place, and we're asking -- we're saying there's agreement -- it's undisputed in this case. They're claiming that Hamas committed the murders and that they had nothing to do with Hamas at that time and, in fact, Hamas was acting contrary to their wishes. Now, again, we have this bizarre response from them on these issues where they say again, defendants state they will produce documents containing nonprivileged and nonprotected information within their possession, custody or control that are responsive to a reasonable and proper scope and interpretation of this request, and that can be found through reasonable search efforts by defendants. again, we have that, you know, we'll give you something if we feel like it answer, and this is very very central to the meritorious defense issue.

The next in sequential order, your Honor, is 9.A and B, and what those requests directly relate to are three issues that your Honor ruled were relevant. One

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is the willfulness of the default, next is the timeliness, and a new issue here, their claim that this relates to willfulness. They had claimed in their pleadings earlier that they had no structure in place to monitor these lawsuits, will take care of these lawsuits, and that was part of why everything sort of went under the radar and they got defaulted, and what 9.A and B asks is who was monitoring the lawsuits that they -- the terrorists lawsuits that they were involved in, in Israel and the United States in the period 1993 when the PA was created through 2007. Now if the argument needs to be made that this is too broad a period of time, which I don't think it is, what I would, as a minimum, would ask the Court to give us is what were they doing in the period that this lawsuit was pending, which is the years 2000 through 2006. And the only reason I say 2006 is that's the date of the creditors' bill default, which they're also asking be vacated. So I deposed Prime Minister Fayyad in Jerusalem, and he testified that indeed they had policies and guidelines for handling these cases at least from 1993 on, and that he, Fayyad, was in charge of the Israeli defense cases, at least from 2003, and we're asking your Honor that we get the records regarding those lawsuits, at least for the period 2000

to 2006, which is directly relevant to the default period here, and we're asking flat out that they give us the policies and procedures which is 9.U through V, the policies and procedures that Fayyad testified under oath existed at least from 1993.

10.A through Q are documents relating to the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Investment Fund which was expressly ruled by your Honor to be an appropriate area.

We're also asking within that group for documents that reflect the Palestinian Authority's awareness of the 2006 creditors' bill judgment which now four years later they're trying to vacate that, also.

And probably most important, most important in this category, are records regarding the payments from the Palestinian Investment Fund to the Palestinian Authority. I can't emphasize how central those documents are to what we're trying to prove in this case, and let me explain a little bit more because there's been some subsequent activity your Honor may or may not be aware of.

We recently attempted to get a preliminary injunction within the last couple of weeks from Judge Lagueux regarding payments by an Egyptian company, Orascom, to the Palestinian Investment Fund, and without

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getting into just, you know, an overwhelming amount of collateral material, Judge Lagueux said that he would not issue the preliminary injunction. He affirmatively said that that does not mean he would not issue a permanent injunction after hearing in January if we could present evidence that the PIF -- excuse me, that the PA was siphoning funds from the Palestinian Investment Fund, which is one of the things we're trying to prove here. We're also trying to prove that under First Circuit case law a party who comes in and asks for the vacatur of a default judgment must have clean hands, and one of the considerations to deny vacatur is if the party has acted with unclean hands. One of the things we want to show is that after Judge Lagueux awarded the stock ownership of the Palestinian Investment Fund to the plaintiffs, took it away from the Palestinian Authority, that notwithstanding that, the Palestinian Authority paid to the -- excuse me, the Palestinian Investment Fund paid to the Palestinian Authority all kinds of money that we contend it shouldn't have, and this was something that Judge Lagueux expressly referred to as being something which might persuade him to enter a permanent injunction. And, in any event, regardless of the injunction issue, we think we're entitled to show that these defendants have completely disregarded Judge

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requests.

Laqueux's order of 2006 turning over the investment fund to the plaintiffs, and that that alone -- by the way, once that argument was made, that precipitated, in my opinion, the recent motion to vacate the 2006 turnover order because I think the defendants realized they have some real peril if we can show that despite the creditor's bill judgment in our favor, they have disregarded the fact that we're the owners. Now that's, your Honor -- I'm not trying to persuade you that we win on that. It's a big issue, but it's an issue we would like to be able to present Judge Lagueux with evidence that there have been many many millions of dollars turned over from the PIF to the PA after the transfer of ownership to the plaintiffs, and so we're asking at an absolute minimum that we get the records of those payments. Now in response to that, they've incorporated their general objections and they said defendants do not intend to produce any documents in response to this request, and --THE COURT: Which request is that again, Mr. Wistow? MR. WISTOW: That relates to all of these

25 THE COURT: Give me a number.

MR. WISTOW: 10.A to Q.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Wistow, I need to tell you that I can probably give you 15 more minutes total, so you may want to hit high points. I have read your memo.

MR. WISTOW: Okay. Fair enough.

THE COURT: And I think I've read it twice, in fact. I think I've read all the memos twice, but I just want to alert you, I'll give you 15 more minutes, hit the high points that you'd like.

MR. WISTOW: I will, your Honor. This is an painful for me as it is for you, I think.

In any event, 13.H through F, the Israeli proceedings, one of the big arguments that has been made before this Court and before the circuit is that the defendants represent immature quasi-governmental group, unsophisticated, didn't know how to handle these things, the suit here, and that's one of the reasons they got defaulted. We would like to show, and we have reason to believe this is absolutely true, that in the -- there were many Israeli suits brought against the PA and the PLO under Israeli law for terrorist activities, and that the PLO and the PA had no trouble defending those cases, participating in discovery, and not getting defaulted, and one of the things we want to show ultimately is the

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reason that they defaulted in this case is because they felt there was never going to be an opportunity for the plaintiffs to ever collect anything, regardless of what the result was. They knew that an Israeli judgment, because of the occupation of the west bank and Gaza, would be collectible against them. So we want to show that they adequately defended those cases.

There's a very specific document we would like, and I think this shows you the approach of the defendants generally to this, it's 13.BB, and it's a specific affidavit of a Muhannad Jaouni dated 2/22/05. It was introduced in an Israeli case. And that relates -- I'll read you what it says. An authentic copy of the affidavit of Muhannad Jaouni dated February 22, 2005 submitted by the PA in the Jerusalem District Court in Civil Case so and so, and it identifies it, and they've taken the position that they're not allowed, among other things, they're not allowed to produce this document. It's inconsistent with Israeli law and procedure. We supplied an affidavit from a professor, Israeli law schools, indicating that the law in Israel is virtually identical to the law here in the United States, that if the PA or the PLO goes to its lawyer, goes to its lawyer and says give me a copy of my file, the lawyer must do it, and this is the affidavit of Professor Lipschits.

The lawyer must provide the documents. In fact, it's a violation of the disciplinary rules in Israel. It's an exact perfect corollary of what we have here. So we're asking for that affidavit.

Similarly, another specific is the Fayyad resignation, which is referred to in 14.A, and they refuse to give us that, and we think that the Fayyad -- Fayyad is the present prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. He was the finance minister during much of the period we're talking about, and we think that resignation letter is going to be vital in terms of showing participation between the PA and the PLO, and we don't understand why we can't get it.

I skipped over some other things. This is -your Honor has read it, and I leave it to your Honor to
decide the relevance and the importance of these
matters. I understand, your Honor, that there's a fair
amount of work to get this stuff together on the part of
the defendants. I don't suggest that this is an
overwhelmingly simple task, although it is for some of
the items like the affidavit and the letter of
resignation, and also the records of payments that the
PIF made to the PA. That should be simple. The others,
I agree, requires some effort, but let's look at the
context of this. These defendants are in this court

saying please relieve us from \$116 million judgment, and let us go forward and do a trial. And we say before you do that, let's go through these steps. Let's take the effort and produce the documents. Agree there's an effort involved. And I think it's warranted.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wistow.

MR. WISTOW: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hill.

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MR. HILL: Thank you, your Honor. Let me start with a big picture point which is this, the arguments that have just been made to your Honor about why these materials need to be produced were never made to me in a meet and confer with the plaintiffs lawyers. attempted to confer with them about these requests before the date of our response, and Mr. Wistow told us he didn't want to talk to us. He would only deal with us in a letter, so we wrote him a letter, and in response to that letter, they removed six of the 205 requests and tweaked the rest. We served our responses on September 27th. Subsequently, Mr. Strachman reflected that we have a meet and confer about our responses, and Mr. Wistow did not participate in that conversation, but I spoke with Mr. Strachman. that conversation, none of the issues that were raised in this motion were discussed with me. There has never

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been a meet and confer between the parties about the substance of the motion that is before you today, and I think more importantly, that conversation with Mr. Strachman took place before we had the arguments in late October, and before your Honor issued the order on the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. And after your Honor issued that order, which as they acknowledge, it substantially narrowed the topics that the Court thought were appropriate for discovery, we never had a conversation about what if anything we would do in response to that order as it relates to these requests. Now I think the fact that we never had that conversation is reflected in what is frankly a waste of the Court's time on some of the issues that have just been argued to you. And I'll just pick a couple of low hanging fruit. One is request 14.A. Your Honor, if I may, I did what the plaintiffs didn't do, which is what is required by the local rule, I actually exerted the requests and the objections, and I have them here. I'd like to hand them up to the Court because I think your Honor needs to look at these requests. May I do that? THE COURT: You may.

MR. HILL: I have copies for counsel, as well, if you'd like them.

Request Number 14.A on the exhibits that I just

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handed your Honor, on page 72, and that says they request an authentic copy of the letter of resignation referred to by Salam Fayyad on pages 289 to 292 of the transcript of his July 28, 2010 deposition. actually a reasonable request. It's very specific. And if you look at our response, we say defendants state they will produce a document responsive to a reasonable and proper scope and interpretation of this request. And what's really extraordinary is that we did. was in the production that we made on September 27th. Mr. Strachman subsequently asked me to provide an index of my production, and I gave it to him, and in that index -- I'm trying to put my hands on right now. This is in the record as Exhibit 17 to our opposition brief, which is document number 610. On page 2 of that document, I don't know if your Honor is trying to find I'll wait. On page 2, in the left-hand column, we it. list 3 RPD 14(a) and we list the bates range, page 12158 That is the two page resignation letter of to 12159. Prime Minister Fayyad, and so it's extraordinary to me that even in oral argument Mr. Wistow is suggesting to the Court that we didn't produce it and asking that I be ordered to produce it when the fact of the matter is I did produce it on September 27th, and, you know, it's just extraordinary to me that Rule 37 requires the

parties to get together and have a conversation to try
and narrow discovery disputes before the Court is asked
to rule on them, and everything I've said about this for
the last few minutes has been a complete waste of
everyone's time, and that's just one example. Let me
give you another one.

The plaintiffs have moved to compel on both their requests 9.A and 9.B and their requests 13.V and 13.W, and if you look at request 9.A, which is on page 18 of the exhibit I just handed your Honor, and to keep your thumb there, and then find 13.V, which is on page 48 of that same document --

THE COURT: Are you saying V as in Victor?

MR. HILL: V as in Victor. 13 Victor on page 48,
and you compare 13.V with 9.A, you'll see they're
exactly the same thing. So they've moved to compel on
two identical requests. And again, if they had just
bothered to have a phone conversation, we wouldn't have
wasted time briefing this issue. There's no point in
moving on two identical requests. And let me give the
Court one more example.

If the Court will look at request number 14.F.i,
I'm sorry, 14.F(iii), so it's 14.F.iii, this is on page
97 of the document I just handed up, this asks for all
documents related to, referring to, and/or evidencing

any and all positions, titles and/or jobs held by Amin Al Hindi in the PA or the PLO on the date that you produced documents in response to this request. So this would have required us to provide documents related to Mr. Al Hindi's jobs, essentially, as of September 27, 2010. Well, Mr. Al Hindi died on August 17, 2010. So this is a request to provide the current job of someone who's deceased. This is something they need to compel on. And again, if they'd just complied with the rule and had a substantive conversation with us about the arguments they're now making about the requests they're now seeking to have us ordered to produce documents in response to, we wouldn't have wasted everyone's time litigating 14.F.iii.

Now, more examples, and I'll reference them as I talk about these individual requests, but I wanted to say at the outset this is not the way you're suppose to do this. We're not suppose to waste your Honor's time and the parties' time briefing a motion on things that can get resolved in a phone call between counsel. And the case law is very clear, that that is the basis alone to deny the motion, and I would request that the Court do that. Now unless the Court's prepared to do that right now, I, of course, need to go on and address the merits, and I'll do that.

THE COURT: Please do.

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MR. HILL: And the second point I want to make is there is also a failure to comply with the local rule, which is local rule 37(a), and I know the Court is familiar with it, but I think it bears reading it into the record, which is, a motion to compel a response, or further response to an interrogatory request for production or request for admission shall state the interrogatory or request, the response made, if any, and the reasons for why the movant maintains the response is That's not been done here. And, frankly, it makes it very difficult to respond to the arguments that are made, and I know it makes it difficult for the Court. I have just handed you the hundred pages of requests that are at issue and the responses that are at That is how much thicker the opening briefs issue. should have been had the local rule been complied with. And I'm going to take your Honor through, if not all of these, a vast majority of them in the course of this argument because I feel I have to have you look at the language that you're being asked to order my clients to comply with, and the plaintiffs want your Honor to do this at 20,000 feet and just say, oh, well, there's some categories here, there's some categories there, but the fact of the matter is the language of the requests

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matter, and that is the language that we've made objections to, and so the notion that the plaintiffs can just say, oh, well, generally this topic area is relevant therefore you should compel the following 22 specific requests, that just can't work that way. got to work through the details and determine whether these are proper in scope, whether they call for privileged information, if they do, whether I should be required to produce a privilege log. Let me make this big point, a lot of these are for all documents relating to a general category of material, including in some instances all documents related to blah, blah, blah, this action. Well, Judge, that literally requires me to log everything in my office about this case, and that is not reasonable. There's no reason for that. And if I sent them a document request that said produce all documents related to this case, they would object and say it's ridiculous, it includes a ton of attorney/client and attorney work product, and I've made those objections. But the arguments the plaintiffs are making is, oh, no, you should just order them to produce all that stuff. And so we're going to need to go through these in some detail, and if your Honor is going to order anything, your Honor is put in the unfortunate position of having to basically blue pencil these

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requests. And I was struck by one of the things Mr. Wistow said in his argument which was there's a mistake in the motion. I think it's with respect to request 4.0, and he says there's an error, we're not asking for all documents related to the action. when you look at 4.0, which is on page 5 of the exhibit I handed to your Honor, it asks for authentic copies of all PA cabinet minutes, protocol and/or records from anytime referencing and/or relating to the judgment, any proceedings brought to enforce the judgment, the 2006 judgment, and/or the instant action. And, again, if we had a meet and confer, and he said, you know what, I'm not asking for everything about the case, I'm just asking about the judgments, well, that would have substantially narrowed this request. Now in this one, it turns out to be a no set because there aren't anything even to the broader ones, but as you'll see as we go through these, this is a consistent problem throughout these document requests. They are requesting in here that literally, if read, require every document that has Salam Fayyad's name on it. There are documents in here that literally, if read, require me to log every document in my office related to this and, frankly, it's not fair to the Court to require you to now take a blue pen to these and make them reasonable. You should

require the parties to have done that before we get here several weeks after the close of discovery on a motion to compel 90, really discount the duplicates, 88 document requests. So I think independently the failure to comply with the local rule and produce for your Honor in a way that's easy for your Honor to utilize the actual requests and the actual responses is another basis on which to deny this without even reaching the individual merits. But I understand the Court wants me to proceed with the argument, and I'll proceed to the individual merits at this point.

THE COURT: Just so you won't be surprised,
Mr. Hill, I'm going to let you begin, because I let
Mr. Wistow begin and go on awhile with each individual
request, but I'm going to limit you to about the same
amount of time Mr. Wistow had. I doubt that you'll get
through all of these, so I'm going to let you go, but
you're not going to get through all of them, I don't
think, unless you speak extremely fast.

MR. HILL: Well, your Honor, I will obviously do as the Court complies. I'd ask that the Court note my objection to that because I'm being -- your Honor is being asked to incorporate these particular constructions into an order, and I think before your Honor can do that I should have the chance to argue them

all, and I will obviously try and meet the Court's timing requirement. I appreciate this could take a long time.

THE COURT: Well, it sounds to me, Mr. Hill, you're suggesting I'm not being fair to you when I -- I don't share that view. The Court's trying to be quite fair. I'm going to let you go, but I generally balance the amount of time allocated to each side on a matter, try to be approximately equal, and I've allowed you to submit documents to support your argument, including the one that you've handed up this morning just now, and you have your written argument, so I really don't think by limiting you to approximately the same amount of time that I allowed Mr. Wistow, I think that you're in any way being deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard.

MR. HILL: I appreciate that, your Honor. I just wanted to note the objection for the record. I will follow the Court's direction.

THE COURT: Specifically, what are you objecting to?

MR. HILL: Well, the problem, your Honor, is there are 88 requests here, and you're being asked to order us to respond to all 88 of them, and I'm just not sure that in 15 minutes I can adequately address 88 requests. I haven't done the math but that's, you know,

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20 seconds per request, or something like that, and some of them are able to be grouped and connected in that way, and I will do my best to address them all. I don't want my client to be prejudiced because the plaintiffs have chosen to move on 88 requests. So let me proceed with --

THE COURT: I haven't limited you to 15 more minutes, Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: I understand.

THE COURT: I've indicated I'm going to allocate to you the same amount of time, approximately, as Mr. Wistow had, and that's all I've indicated to you. Ι haven't cut your argument off. What I've done is to give you the courtesy of letting you know that you're probably in that amount of time not going to be able to get through all of these, and to allow you to know that in advance so that if there are some that you think are more important that you might want to address those first. But other than the fact that I'm saying you're not going to get significantly more time than Mr. Wistow had, I'm not limiting your ability to argue this motion, given the fact that I've accepted your documents and I've read your memorandum. So with that, please continue.

MR. HILL: Yes, your Honor. To address request

number 4.0 to V, which I believe begin on page 5, I

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think these are actually relatively easily disposed of because we've looked for these materials and there are none, and so I don't see any reason why we should be compelled to produce documents in response to 4.0 through V because we haven't found any. Now let me make a distinction between 4.0 to R and 4.F to V, and if I could call the Court's attention to 4.S. The problem here is the breadth of the request. This requires all minutes, protocols and/or records generated by any PA, ministry, agency, department, division, bureau and/or other government body from anytime referencing and/or relating to the judgment, any proceedings brought to enforce the judgment, the 2006 judgment, and/or the instant action. So this is a very broad request. This requires us to search everywhere in the PA for any record generated by anywhere in the PA from anytime relating to the case, and so let me first note it's tremendous overbroad. Secondarily, let me note that it calls for

Secondarily, let me note that it calls for privileged information. I mean, any records from the PA that are communicated to my firm would be attorney/client privilege. It would be unduly burdensome for me to log all attorney/client communications related to the case, but that is facially

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what 4.S requires. We have, as we said in our response, which is on the next page, page 10, we have looked for and said we would produce documents containing nonprivileged and nonprotected information. So again, I'm not going to produce my attorney/client communications, I don't have to, I shouldn't have to, within our possession, custody or control, that are responsive to a reasonable and proper scope and interpretation of the request, and that can be found through reasonable search efforts. And we have done that. We have conducted a reasonable search of the PA to try and find documents that are not privileged, that are about this case, and to this point in time we have not located any. And so I would respectfully ask that we not be compelled to produce documents that we can't find, or to log them all as privileged, which would be a waste of everyone's time.

4.T is similar. It's just with respect to the PLO as well as instead of the AP. 4.U is similar, and this is on page 11 of the exhibit I handed to the Court. It's a little different. Instead of looking for minutes, protocols and records, now we're being asked to look for decisions, orders and directives. But again, it's decisions, orders and directives from anyone in the PA relating to the case. And again, we've looked for

nonprivileged material and we're not locating any. If we find it, we will produce it, but we respectfully ought not be required to log anything our client has written related to the case that's been an attorney/client communication or that's been work product anymore than the plaintiffs should be required to log all of their attorney/client communications or work product.

Let me move, sticking with Mr. Wistow's format of moving through these in numerical order, let me move to 6.J through L. 6.J is located on page 13, and J, K and L of request 6 are the same except for the alleged contracting parties, so J is the PA, K is the PLO and L is Fatah. And looking to J, all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing any communications and written agreements, accords and/or pacts to which Hamas and the PA were parties at anytime between September 1st '93 and June 9th, '96. Let me make a point about relevance, first of all.

Mr. Wistow suggested this was unquestionably relevant to our meritorious defense. We have said this in other discovery responses. Let me make it absolutely clear, the PA and the PLO are not relying on any written agreements, accords and/or pacts with Hamas to assert a meritorious defense. The plaintiffs are relying on

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these alleged pacts to assert our liability, okay? So if the Court is going to limit discovery to our meritorious defenses, these documents are not part of my meritorious defense.

Let me make another point, and that's this, this request as written requires communications and written agreements, accords, and/or pacts, to which Hamas and the PA were parties. We have conducted a search for written agreements between the PA and Hamas, and we can't find any. We don't think there are any. were written agreements between the PLO and Israel, there's the Oslo Accord, but there aren't any treaties between the PA and Hamas. Similarly, there aren't any between the PLO and Hamas, and there aren't any between Fatah and Hamas. So in the absence of any written agreements, accords or pacts, if that's the construction, and I suggest that that is the proper construction since it's communications and written agreements, and is different than or, so we're looking for documents that is both a communication and a written agreement. Since there are no written agreements between these three entities and Hamas, there is nothing that's responsive to these three requests. So that's what this literally requires us to produce, and since we haven't found any written agreements, there's nothing

that's responsive to this. Hypothetically, if there is a written agreement, there's a problem because it doesn't just ask for the written agreement, it asks for all documents relating to it.

Now, your Honor will appreciate that when we got this document request, we started looking for these documents, and there is a fair amount of attorney/client communication and attorney work product that relates to trying to find these documents. Again, I shouldn't have to log my efforts to comply with the document request because they're responsive to the document request because it's so overbroad. It's all documents relating to a written agreement. Well, I went and looked for one. I didn't find one. I shouldn't have to log all the attorney/client communications and attorney work product that went into the effort of finding out that we don't have one. So I'd respectfully request that the motion be denied with respect to the sixes.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hill, have you finished on the sixes?

MR. HILL: I'm done with the sixes, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, it's 12:31, we're going to break for lunch at this point. We'll resume at 2 o'clock. The Court will stand in recess.

(RECESS)

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hill, you may resume when you're ready.

MR. HILL: Thank you, your Honor. Good afternoon. I have endeavored to try and streamline this as much as possible. There are four areas I need to cover which for lack of a better title we could call the nines, the tens, the thirteens and the fourteens, though there's several of some of them. Let me start with the nines and start with 9.A and B, which if your Honor still has the truncated versions, on page 18 is 9.A, and 9.A and B are the same except one is directed to the PA and the PLO.

So, a couple of points we make here. First of all, just the time frame, the request is between '93 and December 2007. I understood Mr. Wistow to say they would like to narrow that to 2000 to 2006. We wouldn't have any objection to narrowing it, however, what I think is, when you read the request, there's also not going to be anything responsive to this, and I'll explain why. It says all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing, and then there's a list of things that these documents have to relate to, refer to, or evidence. One, the organizational, and two, institutional structures, and three, individuals within

the PA responsible for, and again there's another list, 1, monitoring, and 2, making decisions regarding lawsuits filed against PA in, and they got another two things, in, 1, the United States, and 2, in Israel. So this is a document that's got to have all of these things in it, and I don't believe there is such a document, and let me explain why. Let me do that in the context of the next set, which is 9.U and 9.V.

9.U, again these are the same except for the 9.U is the PA and 9.V is the PLO, and 9.U, which is on page 20 of the document that I believe your Honor is looking at, requests for all documents from anytime prior to December 2007, again, I'm assuming this has now been narrowed to 2000, relating to, referring to, evidencing, containing and/or constituting policies, procedures and/or guidelines for the handling of lawsuits brought against the PA. Now this one is broader because it's not limited to lawsuits in the United States or Israel. But I don't think there is a relevant document constituting policies, procedures, and/or guidelines for handling lawsuits brought against the PA.

Let me talk about the prime minister's testimony because that's what Mr. Wistow referenced. The prime minister was examined at some length about whether there were policies and procedures of the PA that would be

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involved here, and the examination starts on page 230 of his deposition and runs to page 256. I'm not going to read it all. But let me make this point, and it's this, and this is -- by the way, it's in the record. Exhibit D to the motion to compel that we're discussing now which is document 484-9, and I'd like to start on page 238. 238, line 5, there's a question: Mr. Fayyad, the minister of justice follows up on what? Frankly, I don't understand. In the Ungar case, what is his involvement? Answer: You know, generally speaking, in all litigation against the PA, or in which the PA is a party, to which the PA is a party, the minister of justice is involved in that sense. Domestic or international, now in the case of Ungar and the other litigation cases against us in the United States, the minister of justice is not involved in decision-making. Okay.

If you would, your Honor, I would like to draw your attention to page 241, starting at line 14. The question is: I get the impression that one of the functions of the ministry of justice for these kinds of cases is that --

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Hill, for some reason my page numbers don't seem to correlate with yours. I'm looking at the page number at the bottom, 241, I also

see at various points different page numbers, so it must be other page numbers that you're referring to.

MR. HILL: Exactly, your Honor. I apologize about that. It's the nature of the exhibit.

THE COURT: You're at 241?

MR. HILL: I'm at 241, line 14 of the smaller pages, if you will.

THE COURT: Yes, okay.

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MR. HILL: Okay. So question by Mr. Wistow: I get the impression that one of the functions of the ministry of justice to these kinds of cases is that, say, request for production of documents or request for answers to interrogatory, are initially worked on by the minister of justice department, certainly not by you, right? Answer: In general. In general, this is the case, however, in this particular case, as in the other cases being litigated in the United States, you know, the process goes through my office. Whether it's a document that's required, an individual being deposed, or any other thing that is of interest to the attorneys, the Court, generally, the request comes to my office and then it goes to, you know, the head of the department concerned, and if it's individual, you know, they appear. If it's a document, they produce it if it's available. Next question, 242, line 8: So the minister

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of justice has not been involved in these cases? In these cases did not have that involvement which the ministry of justice generally has in cases of litigation. So, let me just make a comment here. So the prime minister is saying in the U.S. litigation it's the prime minister's office that makes the decision, not the ministry of justice. The ministry of justice is not involved. Then if you jump ahead, there's a line of questioning about litigation more generally. Okay. So if your Honor would look at page 248, starting at line 5, there's some discussion about a hypothetical lawsuit filed against the PA. It says, okay, so there's no set policy. It's up to you to decide who would get it, is that fair? Answer: Now I can tell you there is a policy in the sense of there are ministries with clear mandates and agencies as to what they're suppose to be doing. What is not really established, what is not there, is established pattern, practice, tradition, but not policy or mandate. Next question, 248, line 19: Is there any written policy, procedure, protocol, or whatever you want to call it, that tells the people who work for the PA where to send any kind of lawsuit, any kind? You know, there is. Of course there is. For example, there are cases, you know, filed against us in local courts, meaning courts in the west bank or Gaza, on a

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variety of matters. What happens is that the attorney general, prosecutor general, acting on behalf of the PA, informs us, informs the relevant agency of the executive branch and of the existence of an action against it, then he would ask in that communication as to what response that agency may have to that particular complaint that's been filed against the PA of any proceeding that's been filed, et cetera, et cetera. So there is a written policy? Answer: Yes. Insofar as that case is concerned, there is. So it's clear when you read the testimony, and of course the Court is free to read this entire exchange, that when the prime minister is talking about a policy, he's talking about a policy that exists for local actions filed against the PA and Palestine. And so therefore when we return to the request at issue here, 9.A and 9.B are about actions in the United States or Israel. Obviously, this policy would not be responsive to those requests. So that leads us to 9.U and 9.V which generally asks for any lawsuits against the PA, but I would submit that the policy about what the PA does when it's sued in the west bank is not going to be relevant here, and I think the plaintiffs agree. If you look at the last -- 13, I believe it is, yeah, so on page 71, 13.VV as in Victor, page 71 of the document request, the exhibit that I

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handed up earlier today, page 71, your Honor, it asks for all documents relating to, referring to, or evidencing any legal or arbitration proceedings other than those explicitly referred to in this request for production brought by or against the PA and PLO at anyplace outside the west bank and Gaza Strip at anytime prior to December of 2007, and so the plaintiffs own requests don't appear to be asking for Gaza and west bank litigation, I can't imagine that it would be So with that understanding, I don't believe there are responsive documents to 9.A, 9.B, 9.U or 9.V, if they're construed literally. Now if they're construed in an overbroad fashion, your Honor could see that there could be many many documents about, as Mr. Wistow put it in his argument, who's monitoring the litigation. I mean, since 2007, my firm has been monitoring the litigation. So if it means to encompass all the litigation documents, then we're back into the same posture of not needing to log all the litigation documents. So I think either way, when you read it literally, there are no responsive documents, and I would ask the Court not to construe it in an overbroad way that would make us log things. I think I'm going to talk about the tens. The

tens pertain to the Palestine Investment Fund. And I

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note, as your Honor is aware, that we have appealed your ruling on the relevance of PIF communications. reargue that issue here. So with that ruling and background, let's talk about whether these particular requests are things that we should be compelled to produce documents in response to. 10.A, which is on page 23 of the handup, asks for all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing the relationship between the Palestinian Investment Fund and the PA. This conceivably is any document the PA has that talks about the Palestine Investment Fund. Conceivably any document would relate to the relationship, and if you look at the definition that the plaintiffs have put on relating to, it is, as the language is by itself, extremely broad. This is on page 31 of the document request. Relate to, or relating to, shall mean and include constituting, discussing, mentioning, containing, embodying, reflecting, identifying, incorporating, referring to, dealing with or pertaining to in any way. So I think literally the overbreadth of this is everything that says PIF on it, and clearly that wouldn't be a reasonable request. I would note that they already have the PIF articles of incorporation. They already have PIF's annual reports, which discuss this very issue. So I don't believe the plaintiffs have

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met their need to showing that the need for additional information about the relationship between the PA and the PIF would outweigh the burden of this particular request, and I don't know that the Court needs to try and fashion a narrower request that would be reasonable. I just ask you to deny the motion to compel on this one.

10.B, which is on page 24, again, this one asks for all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing the PA's knowledge of, and when the PA first became aware of the 2006 judgment. This is the September 19, 2006 creditors' bill judgment. Again, on the one hand it seems very narrow because, as I think Mr. Wistow noted at the November 17th hearing before Judge Lagueux, Mr. Sherman was in the courtroom when Judge Lagueux announced this from the bench, and so in that sense the PA first became aware of it because counsel heard about it in court. So if all we're asking for is all documents relating to when the PA first became aware, they've got the transcript. They've got it already. If they're asking for something else, and it's not clear what they are asking for, you know, it sounds like it's going to, at the very least, involve attorney/client communications between Mr. Deming and the clients. So I don't think there's a basis to compel us to log all communications with the clients from

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September 2006 about the creditors' bill judgment. And, for what it's worth, we're not contending that the PA didn't know about it contemporaneously. No argument that we weren't aware of it. We obviously were aware of it by operation of law when our counsel heard about it from the lips of the Court.

10.C is all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing the transfer, and/or payment of any funds, monies or assets, from the PIF to the PA from the date the 2006 judgment was entered until present day. Let me stop there. Actually, the second one is including all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing in the amounts of such transfer. So this is every document that the PA or the PLO has about any transfer from the PIF to the PA from 2006 to the present. I would submit the objection to overbreadth ought to be sustained here. There's no effort to try and narrow out what they already know about in the motion, in the opposition they filed to our motion for protective order on PA, PIF communications. included in the record several documents that are publicly available that show such transfers. been no showing that we need to go, turn over every stone in the PA and produce every document showing every transfer for this time period. They have that evidence

already.

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THE COURT: They have a record of every transfer between the PIF and the PA?

MR. HILL: I don't know that I can represent that they have the record of every transfer, your Honor. I hesitate to make that representation.

THE COURT: So all you can say is they have some? MR. HILL: Well, and I guess the point I would make is, isn't some enough? I mean, if the issue is that the transfers themselves are somehow evidence of unclean hands, or bad faith, or however you want to characterize it, I mean, I obviously disagree with those characterizations, but they have evidence of millions of dollars of transfers already. So if there is, you know, if we turn the PA upside down and find additional transfers, I don't know it's going to add anything to the plaintiffs' argument that there were transfers. The transfers are either, you know, proper or not, and Judge Lagueux will decide that in some context, I suppose, but there's no need for us to go searching every drawer in the PA to find every document relating to every transfer from 2006 when they've already got substantial evidence that such transfers had taken place.

10.D is related. 10.D asks for all documents -I'm on page 26, your Honor. This one was amended, so

the corrected one is on page 26. All documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing all decisions to carry out the transfers and/or payments. I'm not sure what this adds, referred to in the previous section C, including, but this is a big addition, all documents evidencing the name, title and present whereabouts of any person involved in making, participating, and/or authorizing such transfers and/or payments. Again, this is one that is spaciously overbroad. It would require us to, first of all, figure out who was involved, but then we have to give them every document that has that person's name on it regardless of whether it has any bearing on the case. That's what it literally calls for.

THE COURT: Mr. Hill, you have 10 minutes, maximum.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, I will try and expedite myself. 10.E, all documents constituting the PIF investment fund, articles of association, and/or bylaws. I believe they already have them. I'm not sure why we need to be compelled to produce them, and they should go get them from the PIF, not from us.

10.F, all documents relating to, referring or evidencing the PIF's governing structure and decision-making procedures. Again, they should get them

from the PIF, and they already have the articles of association. I'm not sure what more they need to prove that issue.

evidencing any efforts to change the articles of association of the PIF on any date subsequent to the judgment. Again, they have the amended articles. They ought to get them from the PIF rather than from us, and again, this one has the same overbreadth problem as, I forget which number it is, but they ask for every document with the name of any person involved. So, if hypothetically, President Abbas was at the meeting where they were adopted, then I'd have to give them every document that has President Abbas' name on it under literal construction of this request.

The next one, 10.J, asks for all documents related to, referring to, or evidencing all actions carried out by Mohammad Mustafah on behalf of the PA and all services rendered by Mohammad Mustafah here on behalf of the PA between July 2004 and the present day. Again, I don't know why July 2004 would be relevant. Even under the plaintiffs' theory, it would be September 2006 that would be relevant. But again, why do we need every document about what Dr. Mustafah has done for the PA? There's no showing that that burdensome, you know,

search for every document that has Mustafah's name on it, is justified for the discovery that they claim to need.

And then let me deal with 10.K in the context of the Israeli proceedings. 10.L, which is on page 32, is documents relating to legal actions brought against Orascom by PIF, and 10.M is papers in those cases brought against Orascom by PIF. Again, the plaintiffs have cases against both Orascom and PIF. They can get those materials from those nonparties. I don't know why they need to get them from us. I also note that your Honor previously denied their request for communications between us and Orascom on the theory that it wasn't relevant, so I don't know why this would be anymore relevant than the communications that counsel for the PA had with Orascom that you previously denied the motion to compel on.

I believe I'm now ready to talk about the thirteens. Okay. And the whole series of these, starting with -- I'm sorry, 13.A is again the same as I think 10.B, when we first became aware of the creditors' bill proceeding. We became aware of it when Mr. Sherman got a copy of the creditors' bill. There's no need for any further discovery on that.

So, starting on 13.H, there's a whole series that

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deal with the Israeli proceedings, and let me just make a general point about these rather than going through them individually. So there is a procedure under Israeli law to get these materials from the Israeli courts, and that procedure requires the parties to be informed of that and have a say about whether a nonparty should get them, and I think the appropriate thing for the Court to do is, well, first of all, not allow this because it's not relevant. I mean, you're talking about seven years of litigation in Israel in other cases. just can't fathom that those documents are going to be exhibits in January, or if they are, very many of them could possibly be. So it's a tremendously burdensome request. There's an affidavit in the record from the defendants' Israeli lawyer that says it's going to take 200 hours of time to sort through and make this document production. I note that your Honor previously denied the plaintiffs' request to take a 30(b)(6) on this very issue of the Israeli litigation, so I don't know why it would be appropriate for us to have to produce hundreds or thousands of documents from other cases in Israel if we didn't have to produce a witness to talk about the other cases in Israel. I think your Honor has already ruled on the relevance of this to a certain extent. I'd also note that, you know, the plaintiffs had

Israeli counsel, some of which are counsel in these other cases. It's my understanding that the plaintiffs' Israeli lawyers represent other plaintiffs in Israeli cases in thirteen cases against the PA and PLO. They obviously already have that information through their own counsel, and if there is no prohibition under Israeli law in sharing it, I don't know why they'd need us to produce it again. They've clearly got a relationship with the affiant attached to their motion, Mr. Roth, at Exhibit E, who described some cases he's brought against the PA and the PLO. I don't know why they couldn't get the material from him as opposed to from us.

Let me make one point about a very specific request, which is 13.BB, I believe, which is on page 51 of the exhibit I gave your Honor.

First of all, I need to make a correction to our brief. We said in our brief that this had been marked as an exhibit at a preliminary injunction hearing by PA, PLO counsel. That is a mistake. It was not. In fact, a different affidavit was marked by Mr. Wistow, so that should be stricken from page 26 of our opposition brief. But the point is, this is so clearly described that I have a strong suspicion the plaintiffs already have it, and in fact, it's my understanding that the plaintiffs'

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Israeli lawyer is the lawyer representing the plaintiffs in this case that's described here in 13.BB. And if they don't have it, Judge, I'll give it. I'll give them this one. This one is specific enough. We can go find it. But the notion that we need to produce all of the material from those other cases, I think, is inappropriate.

The other thirteen all pertain to other old American litigation. So there's the Achille Lauro case, there's the PA, there's the PLO, US vs PLO case, there's the Mendelson case, there's the Danish road contractors arbitration proceeding in Europe, there's the Beucheit case. Your Honor didn't allow deposition, 30(b)(6) deposition testimony on these topics. These are other old litigations. They're not likely to lead to relevant evidence that's going to justify the burden of requiring us to go search old files and produce these old materials. And as the plaintiffs acknowledge, in substantial part, these materials are publicly available, anyway. If it's really important to know what orders were entered in the Achille Lauro case, they can go get them from the court that handled the Achille Lauro case, and they ought to do so.

I believe I'm now ready to talk about the fourteenth, which is my last topic, and these are

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similar. They are parallel requests relating to four individuals, Mohammad Dahaln, Jabril Rajub, Tofee Tirawi and Amin el Hindi, and let me get to the first one which is on page 73 of my handout, request number 14.B.1, and the problem with all of these is that they're tremendously overbroad, and we've given them the documents sufficient to show what they claim they want to know. This 14.B.1, I'll just use as an example, all documents relating to, referring to, and/or evidencing any and all positions, titles and/or jobs held by Mohammad Dahaln in the PA and/or PLO between January 1st, '97 and June 6th, '96. This facially calls for every document, every business document, at least, that has Mr. Dahaln's name on it, because any of those would relate to his job. This would be like asking for any documents that relate to Brian Hill's job from my law firm. You'd have to give them everything with my name on it. It's tremendously overbroad. But the point is, if the issue is what job he had at the time, we already produced sufficient information to them to establish that, and we've never had a meet and confer where they've told me, you know, I don't know what he was doing between June and July of '95. If they ask me that, I would tell them. And, in fact, I think a good example of this is, Mr. Dahaln, who's on our witness

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    list, and we're planning to have him testify in January,
    we initially thought he wasn't going to make it. We've
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    noticed his deposition. I got an email from
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    Mr. Strachman saying is Mr. Dahaln currently an officer,
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    director or managing agent of the PA or PLO, and I wrote
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    him back, I think the same day or the next day and said
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    no, he's not. So if the issue is were they officers at
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    the time, what's their officer status today, they're are
    a lot less burdensome ways to get at that information
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    than producing every document that's got Mr. Dahaln's
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    name on it.
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           May I just confer with my colleague to make sure
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    I didn't overlook anything, your Honor? I may be at my
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    time limit, anyway.
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           THE COURT: You may. Have you concluded,
    Mr. Hill?
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           MR. HILL: I think I'm done. Thank you.
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           MR. WISTOW: May I have just a few moments, your
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    Honor?
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           THE COURT: You may, Mr. Wistow.
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           MR. WISTOW: Thank you. I want to say first of
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    all --
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           THE COURT: Mr. Wistow, I'll try to be as close
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    as I can on this. You have a maximum of ten minutes.
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           MR. WISTOW: I won't take that. And I don't mean
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to impose on your Honor's patience. I want to make clear why -- Mr. Hill indicated that he tried to speak with me, and I told him please put it in writing, and your Honor will recall that I was anonymously admonished by the Court for using vulgar language that was quoted in a letter, and I'm certainly not going to repeat the vulgar language, but it was a phrase that concluded with an accusation that Mr. Hill was a liar. I'm sorry to bring this up, but he brought up the subject of why I insisted on a letter from him. I felt that he had made a commitment to me orally, and completely breached it, that's why I used that vulgar phrase that he quoted to your Honor, and that's why I insisted on a letter.

Now, if you listen to Mr. Hill's argument, he's taken everything we've asked and reduced it by the process of (inaudible). There's literally nothing we've asked for with one or two exceptions that isn't too broad. If he keeps saying to the Court that he doesn't have certain items, if he would just state categorically in response to the items that we moved to compel that they don't exist, we would not pursue, and would not have pursued those items here. We would not.

Now he tells us that Al Hindi, for example, died, I believe he said on August 17, 2000, I don't read the obituaries in the west bank, or Gaza, or wherever he is,

and he could have at least dropped us a letter, or done something, to tell us that Al Hindi had passed away. That goes for many of the items he talks about here. He could have simply sent a letter explaining what his position is. The difficulty with trying to negotiate with Mr. Hill on these meet and confers is, I hate to say it, he's been completely and totally unyielding. He only goes one way. There is never a compromise that he's willing to make that we've been able to accomplish, and that's why we're here today. And it really is painful to hear him say that we haven't entered into attempts to meet and confer. They've been the most frustrating experiences I've ever had.

I agree that there are certain things here that are difficult to produce, that require a lot of work, but this is a big big case, and I need to emphasize these defendants are asking the Court to vacate a judgment that's been in place for years and years and years.

By the way, he says that -- I think it's like the essence of his argument, this is exemplary of what he says, why do we need the transfers from the PIF to the PA? Well, we only have some. Why do we need them? Well, one thing is, Judge Lagueux, within the last couple of weeks, said that if we could display that

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money was being drained out of the PIF, that he would consider entering a permanent injunction at the hearing. That's why we need it. I don't even know how to respond. I'm at a loss to say, well, you have some of the information, why do you need the rest. How big a deal is it to get the information of the transfers from the PIF to the PA. They ought to be in one single There's got to be accounts. He says we already place. have the PIF articles, why are we asking for the articles? Well, the reason we're asking for the articles is I know from my experience with Mr. Hill that at the hearing in January, if we attempt to introduce the articles that we have, he's going to say who authenticates those? Where did those come from? don't agree those are the articles. And that's why I want them. I want them to produce them so I can say at the hearing these are the articles, your Honor. were produced by the defendants. He says, well, why don't we get them from the PIF? He has them. Honor has seen the letter from the president of the PA, Mohammad Abbas, where he wrote to Condoleezza Rice in November of 2006 where he said that the PIF, the PIF is under, I quote, the supervision of his office, the PLO president's office. They have these record. So to chase us somewhere else, it's just typical of

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everything, the frustration that we've had. they've done is they produced, I would say, more than 10,000 pages of pleadings from American cases that are readily available to us, and probably 30 pages of real documents out of all the things we've asked for in the past. I ask your Honor to please look at these Some of them are broad, I admit it, but I requests. don't think they're excessively broad. For example, the proceedings in the Israeli courts during the period of time that they were claiming they didn't know how to defend these cases, we would like to be able to show they had a structure in place. They had represented to the circuit court and to this Court that they were an immature organization with no organized structure in place to handle these. We would like to attempt to show that that's not true, and the Israeli documents are going to be very important in that regard. brother says, well, we have some of them from a witness who we may use. Indeed, that's the fact witness that we may or may not use, Roland Roth. Yes, he has some of those documents. What we'd like to show the Judge in January that there's hundreds of these things, and they're readily available to them. Then he says, for example, we already have the

affidavit, very specific affidavit. We've identified

it. So clearly we must have it. Yes, we do have it, but I don't want to be confronted in January with an argument what is this thing? Where did it come from?

And who's authenticated it? So we asked them to produce it. It's an affidavit they gave to an Israeli court.

Your Honor, the deponents that were ordered to come here, that's the last, the fourteens, that's those people that we're talking about, the ones that were ordered to come, and I believe out of the ones that were ordered, I believe they're now all dead with the exception of Dahaln, and so we think we're entitled to get the information we ask for under these very unusual circumstances. I know --

And let me say one further thing about the fact that we didn't include all of these requests within the body of our memo. I don't even know how to respond to that. We attached the next exhibit. It would have made the memo a hundred pages long. So, yes, your Honor has to go to the exhibits to see what we're referring to, but that's the kind of objection we've been confronted with.

I respectfully ask your Honor to, I know how meticulous you've been in this case, to look at our requests, and to look at them in a fashion not to strain reason, to make them utterly unreasonable on their face,

which is what my brother does. It just seems we're not capable of making a request that he is not equally capable of making it seem like we're completely out of balance in what we're asking for. We tried to be restrictive as much as possible in the spirit of what your Honor ordered, and I respectfully ask your Honor to go down the list of things we asked for and independently decide which is relevant and which not.

I do admit, by the way, there were a couple of mistakes we made. We did ask for something twice. We shouldn't have. And there were some other mistakes we had, but this is all part of what we've been confronted with in this brief period where we really are, I used the word before, scurrying, and I'll repeat it, scurrying around trying to keep up with what's been going on here. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wistow. Mr. Hill, with regard to Mr. Wistow's point that as to documents that you say they already have, the reason he wants defendants to produce them is so to avoid objection from you at the hearing in January that the copy they're offering is not authentic or questionable, would you respond to that part of the argument?

MR. HILL: Judge, I wish I heard this before today. There has been an occasion where there was an

issue about whether an email that one of my partners,
Charles MacAleer, who happens to be here today, had sent
in another case. It was an authentic email, and I think
it was Mr. Strachman who emailed me and said is this an
authentic email that Mr. MacAleer sent? And I emailed
him back and said, yes. So, I mean, these can be
resolved through a stipulation about authenticity. I've
instead got a document request that doesn't ask for me
to agree that these are authentic copies of the articles
of association. It asks me to produce all documents
related to the articles of association. That's my point
about burden. There's been no effort to confer and
reach reasonable resolutions to these things.

Your Honor, while I'm here, I'd note two other things just in response to Mr. Wistow, if your Honor will permit me. On the issue of Mr. Al Hindi's death, I think it's apparent that the plaintiffs did know he was dead. If you look at their request number 14, there are four sets of parallel requests of five inquiries, the last one of which is always give me the person's current work and home address. They deleted that for Mr. Al Hindi, so I believe they did know he was dead. I'm not in a position to say for sure.

And on the topic of deaths, my understanding is that the list with Mr. Dahaln, Tirawi and Rajub are

alive, last I knew. That's all I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: And those are three individuals that were sought to be deposed back in 2004?

MR. HILL: That's correct, and one of them is on our witness list and we anticipate he will testify live in January.

THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Hill. All right, I'll take the second motion under advisement. We will proceed now to the third motion scheduled for hearing, that is document 604 which is plaintiffs' judgment creditors motion for protective order, and order quashing deposition notices, or alternatively for an order of preclusion.

MR. WISTOW: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Wistow, I'll hear you on the third motion.

MR. WISTOW: Your Honor has already heard perhaps too much that we were supplied with a list of expert witnesses on October 15th, six and a half years after the judgment was entered in this case. We responded. We provided the experts within 30 days following that October 15th, really in an excess of caution, and maintaining expressly when we produced the experts reports that we did not believe that Rule 26 applied. We expressly said that. But we didn't want to run the

risk that a court might disagree with us and so we came up with those things.

We've decided that from our perspective, we did not wish to take depositions of the other side, even 30(b)(6) depositions, although at first we intended to do it. The various reasons for that, some of them involve our work product and our strategy, but I can say that one of the reasons was so that we were not confronted with the argument that we were required to produce experts because we had taken certain positions. That's a minor issue in the thing. Basically we made a decision, it's common in Rhode Island, not to take expert depositions in the other side. For example, many lawyers who do medical malpractice cases in Rhode Island, many of them do not do expert depositions, many of them do, depending on the case. We decided in this case not to do this.

In any event, after we supplied the names of our experts, which we contend we did really pursuant to interrogatory questions and not 26, we were given a slew of notices to depose our experts, many of which were literally on the same day and at the same time, and we moved for a protective order, and really the basis for the protective order is quite simple, it's that Rule 26(a)(2), which is the only rule that provides for the

taking of deposition of experts, specifically talks about experts who are going to be used at trial. It uses the term trial, and that is not a simply technical position we're taking. Wright & Miller in Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 2031.1 says Rule 26(a)(2) does not apply to hearings on motions, and 26(a)(2), of course, is the provision for taking depositions of experts. And, in fact, Wright & Miller says, and I quote: The disclosure requirement is keyed to trial, unquote, and may not apply to use of experts in various pretrial or nontrial activities. Citing a case UAW vs General Motors Corporation, Eastern District of Michigan, which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.

Now, if you take a look, your Honor, at Rule 33, which relates to interrogatories, it makes no such restriction about using interrogatories only for trials. Similarly, for Rule 34, which is request for production of documents. Same thing for Rule 35, which is physical or mental examination. Same thing for Rule 36, for request for admissions. All of those, if you look at them separately, talk about using interrogatories, document requests, requests for physical exams, really in any kind of actions. The only rule that talks about use at trial is Rule 26. And by the way, the reason for that may well be because for many many years after the

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rules were promulgated you could not take the deposition of an expert at all, and obviously that rule changed, I believe, quite a long time ago, 1970, but when it changed, and it allowed the taking of depositions, it was very clear that it was intended to be for those experts who were going to testify at trial.

Now, my brothers have cited some cases in their opposition to our motion for protective order, which are completely beside the point. In two of the cases where the parties were sanctioned, it was because the lawyers for the adversary had represented and agreed to produce certain people and then didn't. Indeed, two of their cases don't even involve experts at all. Their failure to produce employees at deposition. There's no question that -- I'm not suggesting, by the way, that we don't control the experts to a certain extent. I would not insult the Court's intelligence by that. What I am saying is we have a right to say that the discovery here has to be in accordance with the rules. Judge Lagueux did not in any way, shape or form, change that. He said there would be discovery in the case, and discovery would close on a certain day, and we're ready, willing and able to abide by that, but we also think that the rule regarding experts, I'll read it to the Court, it's facially directly on point: A party may depose any

person who has been identified as an expert whose opinion may be presented at trial, and it's not a flight of fancy that I'm alluding to. I quoted you from Wright & Miller where they make that distinction between trial and hearing.

I would also again ask your Honor to take a look at the language of when you can ask interrogatories, when you can do document requests, when you can do physical exams, when you can do requests for admissions, and your Honor will see that the rules make a distinction.

In any event, we voluntarily produced also reports of experts we're going to use to testify on legal matters, straight legal matters, Israeli law, and under Rule 44.1, it's our position we didn't even have an obligation to produce reports at all on those issues, and it's a fortiori as to those witnesses.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Wistow, I'm not sure
I'm catching the distinction. You're talking about
those witnesses being different from the other
witnesses. Tell me about the two groups of witnesses
you're drawing a distinction between.

MR. WISTOW: Okay. Expert witnesses who are going to testify about matters of Israeli law versus other experts who will testify, for example, about the

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connection between Hamas and the PLO and the PA, and the cooperation between them. That's the distinction I'm drawing, and that distinction is embodied in, I believe, in Rule 44.1 where we simply, if we wished, could submit just plain old affidavits to the Court at the time of hearing, without even producing the expert. The reason for that, your Honor, is that -- I'll just read briefly from the rule: A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country's law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign law, the Court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court's determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law. So there is a distinction. want to burden the Court with making too big a deal out of the distinction. I think it puts an a fortiori spin to the experts on foreign law, but I don't think that's a sufficiently significant point to burden the Court with asking a distinction be made.

I want to point out one other thing, your Honor, the rules really do recognize the difference between a trial and motions. For example, Rule 43 says -- it's entitled Taking Testimony, and it starts off: (A) in open court, at trial, at trial, the witness's testimony

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must be taken in open court unless a federal statute,
the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules or other
rules adopted by the Supreme Court provides otherwise,
and it goes on. It talks about at trial.

Then, (c), evidence on a motion, when a motion was, in fact, outside the record, the Court may hear the matter on affidavits or may it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on depositions. The rules make a distinction between a trial and a motion, and while there's going to be a hearing with evidentiary aspects of it, to it, rather, it still remains a motion, a motion to vacate the judgment, and under the rules, specifically Rule 43, you may have a motion where there is evidence taken, it's still a motion. It's not a trial. And we take the position, your Honor, that we have no obligation to produce these experts, and indeed the rules don't allow for it and we'd ask for a protective order in that regard. We didn't take the extreme position of just refusing to do it. We're not going to act at our peril when the matter is serious. Having said all that, we ask the Court to agree with us that we're under no obligation to produce expert witnesses.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wistow. Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, I'm confident this one

won't take as long as the last one.

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Let me start with again a big picture comment which is that this has, to a certain extent, been overtaken by the close of discovery. As a practical matter now we can't take the depositions because discovery closed on November 19th. On November 29th, in accordance with the Court's deadline for motions, we did file a motion to exclude the testimony of any of the witnesses, the expert witnesses, that the plaintiffs have identified but did not make available for depositions. So, just to be clear, the relief we want from the inability, from the failure of the plaintiffs to produce the witnesses for deposition is that they will not be allowed to testify at the hearing, and that's consistent with the general equitable Rule 37 principles that if you don't make discovery available you can't rely on it at the hearing.

Then let me make this big picture comment. So we're reduced to arguing about the meaning of Rule 26(b)

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If I grant your motion, does that mean you do not intend to take the depositions but simply would perhaps take my order and show it to Judge

Lagueux and say, Judge, you should exclude, grant my motion to exclude the testimony because Judge Martin found that the plaintiffs wrongly failed to produce these witnesses for deposition. You don't intend to try to actually depose these people at this point.

MR. HILL: Well, it does depend on your Honor's ruling, and that's a good point that I should make. So it's not my motion, it's their motion, so I'd ask you to deny the motion under any circumstances, but --

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. You're right on that point, Mr. Hill. It's their motion, they're seeking a protective order. If I deny the motion for protective order, I'm asking you, do you intend to depose these people or are you simply going to take the ruling and use it as support for your other motion?

MR. HILL: Yeah. What I would ask the Court to do is deny the motion, and if Judge Lagueux grants the motion to exclude, obviously I'm quite happy. These people are not going to testify at the hearing, which I think is a fair result. If on the other hand Judge Lagueux is going to deny the motion to exclude and these people are going to be allowed to testify at the hearing in January, I will want them to be produced so I can examine them beforehand. And let me just give your Honor an example of why. Mr. Wistow related the

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depositions that have been taken in this case, and as it turns out, over the 5 and a half month discovery period only 2 depositions were taken, the deposition of the prime minister which the plaintiffs noticed, and a deposition of one of these seven experts, which the plaintiffs noticed, and so what's going on here is when I want to take a deposition of people that are going to testify at the hearing, the plaintiffs say, I'm sorry, you're not entitled to do it, but when they want to take a deposition of somebody who's going to testify at the hearing, they voluntarily produce this person, and of course we attend it because we got the notice that we had to do so, and I think this goes more to the motion to exclude, but this shows why we wanted the depositions. We learned among other things at this deposition of this expert, Offir Saad, that Mr. Saad had not written his own report, that it was written by the plaintiff Israeli lawyer and sent to Mr. Saad for his He gave him a little feedback. The lawyer made review. changes and then Mr. Saad signed it. This is secondhand. I wasn't at the deposition. This is what I understand from the people that were there. So that's an example of why we needed to take these depositions, and I think the overall equitable point is that if these people are going to appear at a hearing, we should have

had an opportunity in discovery to take their depositions. Now I realize they were disclosed relatively late with only a week left, that's why they got notice for the last week of deposition. Some double tracking was necessary when you have seven witnesses and only five business days to do them in, and some less because we got some of the reports on Monday the 15th, and discovery closed on Friday the 19th. So we were trying to avoid the prejudice of not having an opportunity to examine the people before the hearing. That's why we noticed the depositions in the fashion that we did. So why don't we go into the main event, I guess, of which is are we entitled to it, and --

THE COURT: You noticed these depositions were in the United States, correct?

MR. HILL: Well, actually I noticed some in Israel because the history of this, Judge, is that at the October 25th hearing when we were all here in the courtroom, we came in that morning, and we were given deposition notices by the plaintiffs that morning, and four of those were for expert witnesses, we didn't even have reports at that point in time, that the plaintiffs had noticed to take depositions of in Israel.

Subsequently, they decided they didn't want to take depositions of three of those people, they only wanted

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to take the deposition of Mr. Saad, which actually happened last Wednesday, the 1st, by agreement of the parties. So when they withdrew the notices for the other three, we issued notices for those three people in Israel, and the plaintiffs said they're not going to show up, and then on the 12th, I got a list of six additional witnesses, not reports. I only got one report on the 12th. Six additional witnesses, two of which are located, as I understand it, in Providence, and I noticed their depositions for here in Providence, and four of which, I'm not quite sure of everyone's location, I think two are located in Washington. noticed their depositions in Washington. And the last two, I wasn't quite sure where they were because the plaintiffs didn't tell me their addresses. I noticed them for Washington. So, from my perspective, you know, I'm being told a week before discovery closes, here are six additional expert witnesses, and we're just trying to cure the prejudice that we're necessarily going to suffer if we can't depose them before the period ends. And the argument that's being made to you now is, as I think Mr. Wistow acknowledged, rather technical, and I think there's a simple explanation for why the rule talks about deposing somebody who is going to testify at trial, and it is the following. You know, 26(b)(4)(A)

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and (B) distinguishes between two types of experts, as your Honor is undoubtedly aware. There are 26(b)(4)(A) experts, experts who may testify, and 26(b)(4)(B) experts, experts employed only for trial preparation. These are typically thought of as the consulting expert versus the testifying expert. And now it is true that the language of 26(b)(4)(A) says a party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. This is in contrast to 26(b)(4)(B) which says ordinarily a party may not by interrogatories or deposition discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained especially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. So I would submit that the distinction in 26(b)(4)(A) about trial is not about trial versus hearing, it's about testifying at trial versus testifying in anticipation of trial. So I don't think you can read over much into the use of the word trial in 26(b)(4)(A). But let me make the bigger point which is this,

But let me make the bigger point which is this, if the plaintiffs are right, Judge Lagueux entered an order in June pursuant to Rule 16 saying all discovery had to be concluded by November 19, 2010. If he is right, if the plaintiffs are right, that means that we

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will be going to a hearing in January where we will be cross-examining, I guess six, because they noticed one of the seven for themselves, six people that we never had an opportunity to depose during the discovery period, and the plaintiffs' position appears to be that, well, because that's a motion, that's fine, and I respectfully submit that's not what Judge Lagueux had in mind. I mean, this hearing in January may not be a trial in the sense of, you know, a typical jury trial, but it's very much like a trial. He's making factual findings. He's hearing live evidence. If I may, I left something at my desk, your Honor. And I don't know that it's materially distinguishable from any other bench trial that you might have where this would apply. going to quote Mr. Wistow from the November 17, 2010 hearing before Judge Lagueux. This is on page 5 of the transcript at line 15: Your Honor, let me express my concern about the issue. We're down for trial January 18th, as your Honor knows, on the motion to vacate. I mean, you know, this technicality about whether this is a trial versus a hearing is really pushing a technical point here. We're going to have an adversarial hearing in January where Judge Lagueux is expecting to hear live testimony, and make findings of fact, based on that testimony and the documents that are

admitted into evidence, and the plaintiffs are asking your Honor to rule that because 26 uses the word trial, it means that they don't have to produce their experts for deposition unless, of course, they want to depose their own experts, which heightens the unfairness of what's going on here.

I'll also note that we separately moved on the 29th to exclude these witnesses on Daubert grounds, and for a number of them we had a hard time coming up with our Daubert grounds because we couldn't examine them. The typical discovery process is you get a disclosure from a witness, an expert witness, and then you can examine them, and then you can file your Daubert motion, and the Court can perform its gatekeeper function of determining whether this is relevant and reliable and otherwise admissible. All of that has been truncated here because the plaintiffs waited until the end to produce their reports and then wouldn't make the people available for deposition. So I'd respectfully submit that a motion for protective order is not justified.

Let me make a point about Rule 30 which is different than Rule 26, of course. Rule 30(a)(1) says a party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2) which doesn't apply. The

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deponent's attendance may be complied by subpoena under Rule 45. And, Mr. Wistow is right, I do not have a case that says a party has to produce an expert under Rule 30 for deposition because you typically do it under Rule 26(b)(4)(A), and there's no dispute about that. fact of the matter is, these are people that the plaintiffs are paying to give testimony. clearly within their control. They say as much in their opening brief, or they say if your Honor orders them to produce them, they will. So these are not people that the plaintiffs could not have produced for deposition. These are plaintiffs (sic) that the people (sic) didn't want to produce for a deposition, and I think unfortunately, as Mr. Wistow was explaining part of the rationale, he was suggesting that he didn't take our experts in part because they wanted to maintain this position. That's not what civil discovery is suppose to The parties are suppose to make disclosures. be about. They're suppose to discover the facts before you get to the trial or evidentiary hearing, or how you might characterize January's proceedings, and that helps the Court, because the Court is not then faced with us doing an exploratory cross-examination. The Court's got a real cross-examination because we've already done a deposition, and so for those reasons I would ask that

1 the Court deny the motion for protective order. 2 There is a cross-motion which I don't think Mr. Wistow mentioned seeking to exclude all evidence 3 from us. I don't know how seriously this is pressed, 4 but I mean I'll just make the point that under Rule 37 5 in order to exclude evidence from the defendants for 6 7 failure to provide initial disclosures there would have 8 to be some prejudice to the plaintiffs. There is none here. They sent us interrogatories saying who your 9 10 witnesses are. We answered them. We supplemented them. They asked us what our exhibits were. We produced them. 11 12 So there's no prejudice that would merit some preclusive 13 sanction against the defendants. THE COURT: The cross-motion is not before me. 14 MR. HILL: The cross-motion is not before you, 15 16 okay. Well, then you don't need to --17 THE COURT: Not this afternoon, certainly, Mr. Hill. 18 19 MR. HILL: Then you don't need to have me talk 20 about that. Thank you, your Honor. 21 MR. WISTOW: I'll be very brief, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Wistow. 23 MR. WISTOW: Actually, the motion for protective 24 order asks alternatively, if the Court believes that

Rule 26 applies, that there be a preclusion against the

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defendants in this case because they did not produce the

THE COURT: That's included within the motion.

MR. WISTOW: It is within the motion.

THE COURT: All right, thank you for alerting me to that fact.

MR. WISTOW: And, by the way, my brother says there's no prejudice because they supplied all this information. He said that within a minute or two after commenting that we waited until "the last minute" to give our experts. I would remind the Court, we got their expert reports October 15th. They've been adding witnesses through, I told you, most recently November 11th. They didn't make the initial disclosures. I'm not saying they have to. I'm saying if Rule 26 applies, then it applies for them, also. It's staggering to me, your Honor, to hear Mr. Hill say that I'm being technical. If anybody is being technical in this case, in a million places, it's Mr. Hill, and he's entitled to be technical. I'm entitled to be technical, also. We didn't -- and, by the way, I misspoke that day when we were in front of Judge Lagueux, we were there on a preliminary injunction hearing, and I used the term "trial" once, and I misspoke. We were very careful, always in writing, to take the position that our

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disclosures were not intended to be under 26(a). That cannot be (inaudible). So if I'm going to be punished for that error that day, I think that that's a bit much. The depo that we did take of Saad, one of our experts, was a de bene esse depo. It was not a discovery depo. We're not taking depositions of our own experts for discovery purposes. We did it because Mr. Saad cannot be in the hearing in January, cannot, so we felt his testimony was important, and we took his depo for that reason. It was not a discovery depo.

By the way, the statement that's made, I wasn't present at the hearing in the deposition, either, but my understanding of how the report of Mr. Saad was generated was contrary to what Mr. Hill says. Mr. Saad, who is not a fluent English speaker, he speaks English, he told an Israeli attorney what to put in the affidavit specifically. That Israeli attorney did so, sent it to Mr. Saad. Mr. Saad made changes in the English because he has a good enough English to understand what it says, although he prefers not to write it in the first instance. He did make changes and then confirmed under oath that the affidavit, excuse me, the report, represented his honest beliefs. So I think it's totally unfair to make the suggestion that Mr. Hill did. And I stand on what I said, your Honor. We filed in good

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faith a motion for protective order. We're not trying to delay anything. We're the first to recognize that if we're wrong about our interpretation of the law, your Honor will say so and we'll do the best we can to remedy it. But we were not trying to pull any fast ones about giving this information at the last -- that is so painfully here, Judge. We get all of those expert reports on October 15th. We give everything back to them, and you've seen what those reports look like, within 30 days, and they say we waited until the last minute. On the contrary, we believe that the dates on their expert reports are all October 15th. The day they were submitted indicates that they told their experts to hold off giving the reports. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Wistow. I'll take these matters under advisement. I'll issue written rulings. I intend to work on this immediately. I recognize these matters are pressing. Because they're pressing, my ruling will be similar to the previous orders I've issued, which means they'll be relatively brief. I'll try to put forth my reasons for ruling as I do, and I'll try to get them out promptly. If the plaintiffs are able to submit those documents this afternoon, do so. If they're not, Monday is acceptable,

Mr. Strachman. I'm referring to the in camera review.

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All right, this will conclude the hearing. The Court
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    will be in recess.
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                  CERTIFICATION
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    I, court approved transcriber, certify that the
    foregoing is a correct transcript from the official
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